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ABSTRACT
Social finance is fast becoming a mainstream source of funding for
goods and services that target poor people across the globe. With social
finance, impact investors put their capital behind enterprises that profitably
cater to underserved populations by expanding access to critical goods and
services, such as healthcare, affordable housing, credit, and quality
employment. Social finance is hybrid in that it is driven by both social and
commercial imperatives: Impact investors and social businesses want to
generate financial returns alongside a positive social impact. While
hybridity creates pathways for changing the role of business in society, it
also creates openings for explosive conflicts of interest that can harm the
very people whose lives are supposed to be improved. This article argues
that social-financial hybridity presents a pressing regulatory challenge that
must be addressed. It evaluates the potential for three newly established
Social Stock Exchanges (SSEs)—platforms designed to connect investors
with social businesses in need of capital—to bridge this regulatory gap.
Treating SSEs as transnational rulemaking laboratories for social finance,
this study reveals how current regulatory frameworks fall short of filling
the hybridity cracks through which beneficiaries can slip and recommends
measures for correcting this deficit.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Social finance makes a compelling promise: to make the world
a better place by harnessing the power of the market to address
pressing global social challenges—to do well financially by doing
social good. In order to fulfill this promise, however, social
finance—or impact investing—must strike a delicate balance
between two historically opposed imperatives: profit and social
benefit. And when this balance tips in favor of profitability, social
finance can end up harming the very people whose lives it seeks to
improve.
Because it operates at the intersection of commerce and
philanthropy, social finance is hybrid in that it does not fall neatly
under existing regimes for regulating charities, securities, or
corporations. This article proceeds by identifying hybridity as a
significant regulatory challenge that must be addressed in order to
ensure that social finance keeps its social promises. It makes the case
for regulating social finance and recommends that regulation be
designed with an eye to maintaining a healthy balance between
social and financial objectives and, crucially, to protecting the
interests of the ultimate beneficiaries. It then assesses the potential
for social stock exchanges (“SSEs”) to bring this regulatory project
to fruition.
With social finance, impact investors put their capital behind
ventures (known as “social businesses”) that profitably cater to
underserved populations. These businesses provide access to
critical goods and services, such as financial services, healthcare,
affordable housing and quality employment to the economically
and socially disadvantaged—people excluded from ordinary
markets because conventional businesses view them as being too
costly or risky to service or employ.
In a world of diminishing public funding for addressing social
problems, governments and international organizations are
evermore eager to put private investment to work in the social
sphere. In a strong expression of support for social finance, British
Prime Minister Cameron launched the 2013 G8 Social Impact
Investment Forum, saying:
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We’ve got a great idea here that can really transform our
societies by using the power of finance to tackle the most
difficult social problems that we face. Problems that have
frustrated government after government, country after
country, generation after generation. . . . The potential for
social investment, I think, is really that big.1
Buoyed by the enthusiastic backing of both public and private
sector actors, social finance is fast becoming a mainstream source of
funding for goods and services that target the global poor. Studies
produced by entities such as the World Economic Forum, JP
Morgan, and Credit Suisse indicate that anywhere between $500
billion and $1 trillion could be channeled into impact investments
by 2020.2 To put these figures in perspective, consider that even at
the lower end of this range, impact investments would surpass
Official Development Assistance—the prevailing measure of public
funding to developing countries—by a factor of four.3 Since about
70% of impact investments are currently being deployed in
emerging markets, the financial volumes at stake are potentially
quite transformative.4
Social finance seeks to remedy problems that are caused or
aggravated by market exclusion while exploiting the tremendous
market opportunities that exist at the “base of the pyramid”
(“BoP”).5 So far so good. However, the pursuit of hybrid returns—
financial and social—on investment creates openings for conflicts of
interest that, if left unchecked, can harm the intended beneficiaries.
The latter are characterized by acute financial and non-financial
1 David Cameron, U.K. Prime Minister, Opening Speech at the G8 Social
Impact Investment Forum on Social Investment as a Force for Social Change (June
6, 2013) [hereinafter Cameron Speech].
2 WORLD ECON. FORUM, FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM: ASSESSMENT OF
THE IMPACT INVESTMENT SECTOR AND OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE MAINSTREAM
INVESTORS 5 (2013), [hereinafter WEF REPORT], http://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEF_II_FromMarginsMainstream_Report_2013.pdf.
3 Aid to Poor Countries Slips Further As Governments Tighten Budgets, OECD
(Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurtherasgovernmentstightenbudgets.htm.
4 J.P. MORGAN & GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, SPOTLIGHT ON THE
MARKET: THE IMPACT INVESTOR SURVEY 5 (2014), http://www.thegiin.org/binarydata/ 2014MarketSpotlight.PDF.
5 ALLEN HAMMOND ET. AL., WORLD RESOURCES INST., THE NEXT 4 BILLION:
MARKET SIZE AND BUSINESS STRATEGY AT THE BASE OF THE PYRAMID 3 (2007),
[hereinafter NEXT 4 BILLION], http://www.wri.org/publication/the-next-4-billion.
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vulnerability. They, too, live at the intersection of commerce and
philanthropy. With the limitations of public and philanthropic
funding becoming more apparent, particularly in the wake of the
global financial crisis, these individuals become evermore
dependent on the market for meeting their basic needs. This
dependency in turn creates new vulnerabilities at the BoP.
The history of microfinance (one branch of social finance) in
India has taught us that under-regulated hybridity can have
catastrophic consequences. Microfinance Institutions (“MFIs”) are
founded on a strong social mission—to improve the livelihoods of
the poor by making credit available to individuals who are
considered ineligible for conventional financing because they lack
credit history and collateral to secure the loan. But MFIs also
advance a strong financial mission in the sense that the credit they
make available is not free: Micro-borrowers, typically poor women,
must repay the loans, often at a high rate of interest. This
combination of social and financial objectives within a single
business exemplifies the hybridity feature of social finance.
In recent years, many successful MFIs have seen their financing
evolve from being grant-based and sourced from philanthropic
foundations, to equity-based and sourced from commercial
investors. Under increased commercial pressure, some MFIs in the
Indian state of Andhra Pradesh prioritized expanded growth targets
over social impact, effectively departing from their social mission.
In a pattern reminiscent of the sub-prime crisis in the United States,
MFI “lenders to the poor” became embroiled in aggressive overlending and debt collection practices that culminated in a wave of
borrower suicides in 2010.6
This tragic story embodies an extreme instance of mission drift,
whereby an entity strays from its social mission and prioritizes
“profits to the detriment of the social good.”7 However, the risk that
less dramatic versions of mission drift will undermine the promise
of social finance is endemic and must be mitigated. The influence of
(existing and potential) investors on businesses that service the poor
6 HARVEY KOH ET AL., BEYOND THE PIONEER: GETTING INCLUSIVE INDUSTRIES TO
SCALE 72 (2014), http://www.beyondthepioneer.org/wp-content/themes/
monitor/Beyond-the-Pioneer-Report.pdf [hereinafter BEYOND THE PIONEER].
7 Julie Battilana et al., In Search of the Hybrid Ideal, STAN. SOCIAL INNOVATION
REV. 52 (2012) [hereinafter Hybrid Ideal], http://ssir.org/articles/entry/in_ search_
of_the_hybrid_ideal?utm_content=bufferbf4c7&utm_medium=social&utm_
source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer.
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requires particular vigilance. It is precisely when social businesses
become successful enough to attract commercial investment that
mission drift can create cracks in the social goods supply chain
through which beneficiaries can slip.
The challenge for regulators is therefore to ensure that impact
investors and social businesses remain firmly committed to the
social mission of their enterprise. Such commitment must be
resilient in the face of pressure to prioritize profit over impact or to
undermine the “double bottom line.”8 Yet today, the investors and
businesses operating within the social finance space are generally
under-regulated.
Enter SSEs—new platforms designed to connect “businesses that
deliver social and environmental value with investors seeking both
a social and a financial return.”9 Businesses looking to diversify
their financing and scale up operations can “list” on SSEs and
transact with investors seeking some combination of financial
returns and positive social impact. Like conventional stock
exchanges (“CSEs”), such as the New York Stock Exchange or the
London Stock Exchange, SSEs serve a regulatory function by
requiring listed entities to comply with a number of rules and
requirements in order to be and stay listed. For example, listed
social businesses must produce (at least) annual reports that disclose
their performance; however, unlike CSEs, SSEs require that these
reports contain information about social, as well as financial
performance.
No fewer than three SSEs were established in 2013: The U.K.
Social Stock Exchange (“SSX”), Canada’s Social Venture Connection
(“SVX”), and the Singapore-based Impact Exchange (“IX”), which is
a platform of the Stock Exchange of Mauritius. Although they are
still young, SSEs are actively working to fill the regulatory vacuum
in which social finance currently operates. Just as CSEs did for
conventional finance centuries ago, SSEs today serve as
“transnational rulemaking laboratories” for social finance. They
develop and test tools for distinguishing social businesses and
impact investors from their conventional counterparts, establish
procedures for standardizing social finance transactions, and shape
8 Lori Kozlowski, Impact Investing: The Power of Two Bottom Lines, FORBES (Oct.
2,
2010),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorikozlowski/2012/10/02/impactinvesting-thepower-of-two-bottom-lines/.
9 Cameron Speech, supra note 1.
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the relationships between key stakeholders—investors, issuerbusinesses, and beneficiaries.
It is important to track how, and how well, SSEs are carrying out
these experiments, since this work could determine the content of
social finance regulation for years to come. Accordingly, this article
reviews each SSE and assesses how effective it is in bringing
regulatory order to social finance. It finds that so far, all are wanting.
To protect the promise of social finance, SSEs must protect the
interests of beneficiaries and those of investors. However, SSEs rely
too heavily on the blueprint set by CSEs, which prioritizes investors
over investment-affected individuals and communities. This
approach obscures the interests of beneficiaries, and therefore
constitutes a dangerous foundation for social finance regulation.
To correct this deficit, I recommend injecting strong beneficiaryprotections into each dimension of the SSEs’ regulatory framework,
including mission statements, listing and corporate governance
requirements,
reporting
requirements,
and
enforcement
mechanisms. For example, SSEs should require issuers to report not
only on financial and social performance metrics, but also on the
substantive feedback from beneficiaries. Issuers should also be
required to have a Social Director whose job is to ensure compliance
with the social mission and to link beneficiaries to management. To
minimize commercial pressures to drift, investors must themselves
be “patient” and committed to their investees’ social mission.10 SSEs
should therefore screen investors before granting platform access
and require them to subscribe to a patient investor code of conduct.
Investment exits should also be managed by requiring that impact
securities be on-sold only to other (screened) impact investors.
This article proceeds in five Parts: Part I provides a primer on
social finance, explaining how it works and introducing the key
stakeholders—impact investors, social businesses, and the
beneficiaries. It sets out a typology of beneficiaries to clarify some
of the interests and vulnerabilities at stake. Part II identifies the
regulatory challenge created by social-financial hybridity, in
particular in the case of commercially successful social businesses,
and underscores the importance of regulating against mission drift.
10 See What Is Patient Capital?, ACUMEN FUND (last visited Oct. 13, 2015),
http://acumen.org/ideas/patient-capital/ (explaining that patient capital is “a
form of investment that has a high tolerance for risk, has long time horizons, is
flexible to meet the needs of entrepreneurs, and is unwilling to sacrifice the needs
of end customers for the sake of shareholders”) [hereinafter ACUMEN FUND].
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Part III sets the stage for understanding the role that SSEs can play
in bringing regulatory order to the social finance space. It highlights
the limitations of importing the CSE approach to regulation into the
SSE context because that approach fails adequately to protect
beneficiaries. Part IV describes the three SSEs and identifies the
strengths and weaknesses of each model. Part V offers an overall
assessment of SSEs’ regulatory performance to date and makes
concrete recommendations for improvement, with a particular
emphasis on beneficiary protection.
2. SOCIAL FINANCE: A PRIMER
This Part lays the foundation for understanding the regulatory
challenge that hybridity brings to bear. It explains what social
finance is and introduces the main stakeholders—impact investors,
social businesses, and the beneficiaries. By drawing attention to the
diversity among impact investors and social businesses, in
particular their varying commitment to achieving both social and
financial objectives, this Part shows how social-financial hybridity
creates openings for serious conflicts of interest. It offers a typology
of beneficiaries in order to better understand the relationships
between these individuals and the social businesses with which they
transact. The typology further serves to clarify how harm can ensue
if beneficiary-social business relationships devolve as a result of
mission drift.
2.1. What Is Social Finance?
The pursuit of double or triple bottom line returns on
investment—financial, social, and environmental—is alternatingly
referred to as social finance, impact investing, or shared value
investing, and I use these terms interchangeably. One way to
understand social finance is as an alternative mode of financing for
socially beneficial goods and services that have traditionally fallen
within the purview of government. It involves bringing private
capital and market-based business solutions to bear on the world’s
most pressing social and environmental problems. This article
focuses primarily on the social (or human) rather than the
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environmental category of problems, because, as argued below, that
is where the regulatory framework for governing social finance is
most lacking.
Social finance has gained a lot of traction in recent years, rising
in prominence among the business, philanthropic, and development
communities, as well as among domestic and international policy
makers. It has captured imaginations in part because of the volumes
of capital involved. Since the term impact investing was coined in
2007, we have witnessed increasing amounts of funds being
channeled into social finance,11 and many predict that these
problem-solving capital flows will exceed Official Development
Assistance (“ODA”) by 2020.12 While the money alone is a sufficient
reason to take social finance seriously, the ideas that fuel social
finance may constitute an even more important reason to pay
attention. These ideas have the potential to change how and which
socially beneficial services and goods (e.g. housing, health,
education, and electricity) are financed, and therefore to transform
global social provisioning systems.
This demands special
consideration, especially for those interested in improving global
social welfare and in using law and regulation to support that effort.
The Global Impact Investing Network (“GIIN”), an industry
association for social finance, defines impact investments as follows:
Impact investments are investments made into companies,
organizations and funds with the intention to generate social
and environmental impact alongside a financial return.
Impact investments can be made in both emerging and
developed markets, and target a range of returns from below
market to market rate, depending on the circumstances.13
11 See J.P. MORGAN & GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, SPOTLIGHT ON THE
MARKET: THE IMPACT INVESTOR SURVEY 4-9 (2014), http://www.thegiin.org/binarydata/2014MarketSpotlight.PDF (presenting a survey conducted among 125 impact
investors concluding that about $60 billion was invested in 2013).
12 See Sasha Dichter et al., Impact Investing: Closing the Pioneer Gap, STAN. SOCIAL
INNOVATION REV. 42-43 (Winter 2013), http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2187/
docview/1265597236?pq-origsite=summon (providing a helpful examination of
this figure); see also WEF REPORT, supra note 2, at 10 (establishing that the value of
the impact investment market might reach between $400 billion and $1 trillion by
2020).
13 See What Is Impact Investing?, GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK,
http://www.thegiin.org/cgi-bin/iowa/resources/about/index.html (last visited
Feb. 28, 2015) (providing an outline on the definition, key characteristics, and
function of impact investing).
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Speaking to investors, the GIIN website goes on to explain that
“investments are made into enterprises and funds that expand
access to critical goods and services, and/or generate positive
impact through their operations. For example, investors may seek
to use investments to increase access to financial services, education,
healthcare, affordable housing or quality employment by
underserved populations.”14
The GIIN’s definition helps to make an important distinction
between social finance and socially responsible investing (“SRI”).
Specifically, impact investing or social finance can be understood as
an enriched form of SRI, or as “SRI-plus.” The onus on businesses
receiving impact investments is not only to avoid contributing to
social and environmental harms, which is the domain of
conventional SRI, but also to produce social and environmental
benefits for the company’s stakeholders, who extend far beyond
shareholders—the communities they work in, the individuals they
employ, and the public at large. While conventional SRI screens out
companies that produce social or environmental harms (e.g.,
tobacco, weapons, alcohol, gambling),15 impact investing seeks
actively to benefit society, and to do so profitably wherever
possible.16 In short, social finance is promoted precisely as a move
away from the “‘social responsibility’ mind-set in which societal
issues are at the periphery, not the core.”17
While the range of social finance activities is broad, two
important common denominators can be identified. First, the
purpose of social finance is to advance social welfare by channeling
capital into businesses that fill gaps in the provisioning of socially
beneficial goods and services to underserved demographics. These
gap-filling activities must be carried out in a way that is at least
commercially sustainable, if not profitable. The second common
denominator pertains to the category of individuals who are

Id.
See MATT KROGH, B. CORP., CHANNELING INVESTMENT FOR IMPACT: NEW
RATING SYSTEM HELPS INVESTORS MOVE BEYOND RESPONSIBILITY 17 (2009),
https://www.bcorporation.net/sites/all/themes/adaptivetheme/bcorp/pdfs/20
09AP-Channeling-Impact.pdf (elaborating on the SRI screening process).
16 Mitchell L. Strauss, Six Questions About Impact Investing, OPIC (June 5, 2012),
http://www.opic.gov/blog/education/six-questions-about-impact-investing.
17 Michael Porter & Mark Kramer, The Big Idea: Creating Shared Value, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Jan.-Feb. 2011), at 64.
14
15
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supposed to see their lives improved as a result of social finance—
namely, the poor, who are referred to as beneficiaries.
Often referred to as an “industry,”18 a “movement”19 or an “asset
class,”20 social finance and impact investing are umbrella terms that
describe a type of economic activity that seeks to do more than
simply make money. Drawing on the legacies of community
development finance,21 social finance seeks to address social
problems through market-based solutions. These solutions differ
fundamentally from those supported by philanthropy in the sense
that they are designed to be commercially sustainable. Thus, while
philanthropy involves money gifts that are finite and uncertain,
social finance seeks out investment opportunities that can generate
self-perpetuating income streams.
The social businesses that receive impact investments are just
that: businesses. Their operations are financed through their
revenues. As such, they are different from non-profit organizations
that often depend primarily on charitable contributions and grants
to fund their work.
Sir Ronald Cohen, chairman of Big Society Capital, the U.K.’s
recently established social investment bank, explains that, “most
charitable organizations are small and have no more than a few
months of funding at their disposal. Yet there is one resource—
vastly bigger than the resources currently available to either
government or the social sector—that has remained largely
untapped for social purposes: the capital markets.”22 The market,
private capital, and business acumen are increasingly being called
Id. at 67.
JESSICA FREIREICH & KATHERINE FULTON, MONITOR INST., INVESTING FOR SOCIAL
AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: A DESIGN FOR CATALYZING AN EMERGING INDUSTRY 9
(Jan. 2009), http://www.monitorinstitute.com/impactinvesting
[hereinafter
MONITOR].
20 NICK O’DONAHOE, ET AL., J.P. MORGAN & ROCKEFELLER FOUND., IMPACT
INVESTMENTS: AN EMERGING ASSET CLASS 24-29 (2010) [hereinafter EMERGING ASSET
CLASS],
http://nonprofitfinancefund.org/files/11-2910jpmorganchaserockefellergiin- abl.pdf.
21 Community development uses tax incentives to attract investment into
underserved areas to increase the availability of affordable housing, for example,
and Community Development Financial Institutions provide credit and financial
services to underserved markets and populations. Id. at 7.
22 Sir Ronald Cohen, Big Society Capital Marks a Paradigm Shift, STAN. SOCIAL
INNOVATION REV. 21 (Summer 2012),
http://www.ronaldcohen.org/
sites/default/files/3/Summer%20202012_Big%20Society%20Capital%20Marks%2
0a%20Paradigm%20Shift.pdf.
18
19
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upon to supplement public and philanthropic initiatives to solve
social problems.23 Faced with a problematic combination of
dwindling resources and serious global social problems,
government, international development organizations, and
foundations are under pressure to identify ways to crowd in private
investment in order to finance social goods.24
Market-based approaches to social problem solving are
promoted on the view that public spending on social welfare,
development assistance, and philanthropy are generally ineffective:
Traditional approaches tend to address unmet needs for
health care, clean water, or other basic necessities by setting
targets for meeting those needs through direct public
investments, subsidies, or other handouts. The goals may be
worthy, but the results have not been strikingly successful.
A market-based approach . . . looks for solutions in the form
of new products and business models that can provide goods
and services at affordable prices . . . . Perhaps most
important, traditional approaches do not point toward
sustainable solutions – while a market-oriented approach
recognizes that only sustainable solutions can scale to meet
the needs of 4 billion people.25
Commercial sustainability is a very important pillar of social
finance. When an impact investment generates a financial return
23 Mirjam Schöning et al., Taking a Realistic Approach to Impact Investing:
Observations from the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Social
Innovation, M.I.T. INNOVATIONS J. 168-69 (2011), http://www.weforum.org/pdf/
schwafound/TakingARealisticApproachToImpactInvesting_MIT_Innovations.
pdf.
24 See Jean-Michel Severino & Olivier Ray, The End of ODA: Death and Rebirth of
Public Policy 5-6 (Ctr. for Global Development, Working Paper No. 167, 2009),
available at http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1421419_file_End_of_
ODA_ FINAL.pdf (detailing the expansion of non-governmental actors in the
funding of international development); see also WEF REPORT, supra note 2, at 4
(“Social issues continually present significant fiscal challenges for governments of
developed, emerging and frontier economies . . . . Philanthropic organizations –
while noble and needed – will not be able to solve the most pressing social problems
alone due to their limited resources . . . . Impact investing offers an opportunity to
creatively fund projects that may otherwise go unfunded, while also helping to
scale organizations with viable business models”).
25 NEXT 4 BILLION, supra note 5, at 11, 6–7 (defining the base of the economic
pyramid, or “BoP,” in the context of emerging markets, as “those with annual
incomes up to and including $3000 per capita per year,” which, when combined,
constitutes a $5 trillion global consumer market).
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sufficient to sustain itself, it has done what philanthropy and public
assistance cannot: It has tapped into the forces of market,
ownership, and innovation to create the means for its own
reproduction, and reduced (ideally, eliminated) the dependency on
“free” money.26 As exemplified by microfinance, one strand of
social finance: “For many, the revolutionary appeal of the
microfinance movement was that poverty might be alleviated in a
way that does not require continuous subsidies.”27
The policy of privatizing public goods (e.g., energy and water,
healthcare, and policing) has been pursued in many economies for a
long time and has been subject to both positive and negative
critiques.28 In a sense, social finance takes privatization to a new
level by reframing social problems as market opportunities. In fact,
social finance creates a new market where social impact is
transformed into a commodity that can be invested in and traded.
This is both promising and problematic. This is promising because
additional money and innovation are being deployed in the service
of solving a wide range of social problems. This is also problematic
because establishing a new market for social impact creates
openings for new types of market failures that can cause harm to
social finance beneficiaries, as discussed below.
Some worry that by injecting market logic and expectations of
return into the social goods arena, social finance will negatively alter
the framework for making decisions about what problems to solve
and what initiatives to finance. To clarify, with social finance,
capital chases enterprises that generate both financial and social
returns; this creates a concern that initiatives that produce only (or
mostly) social returns will become under-funded. The same concern
applies to initiatives that produce social impact over a long period
of time or in a way that isn’t easily measurable. For example, critics
like Michael Edwards fear that the marketization of social impact
26 See, e.g., WEF REPORT, supra note 2, at 4 (presenting how free-cash flow
enables the evaluation of a company’s financial performance); see also SOCIAL
FINANCE, A NEW TOOL FOR SCALING IMPACT: HOW SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS CAN
MOBILIZE PRIVATE CAPITAL TO ADVANCE SOCIAL GOOD 7 (2012),
http://www.socialfinanceus.org/sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/small.SocialFina
nceWPSingleFINAL_0.pdf
(explaining that “Unlike public sector or grant
funding, impact investments produce financial returns that can be reinvested in the
social sector”).
27 Hybrid Ideal, supra note 7, at 52.
28 See generally JODY FREEMAN, GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Martha Minow eds., 2009).
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and the attending emphasis on measurable returns will sideline the
less-quantifiable work of civil society and non-profit groups that
have proven successful in bringing about lasting social change.29
Edwards cautions that institutionalizing market approaches
within the social provisioning sphere can narrow the social
problem-solving toolkit in a way that favors marketable solutions
rather than impactful ones: “[P]hilanthropy was valued precisely
because of its ability to fund organizations and activities that did not
make . . . returns and whose success could not be measured by shortterm standard metrics.”30 He adds that a serious problem arises
when “one particular approach dominates all others so that the tools
of business and measurement are conflated with the underlying
ideologies of the market and technocracy . . . with the result that
equally-valuable alternatives are being displaced and delegitimized,
leaving large areas of work unsupported or under-funded.”31
Social finance and impact investing have tremendous potential
for bringing more self-sustaining capital and initiative to bear on
solving pressing social problems. However, establishing a market
for social impact—a project in which SSEs actively participate—also
creates new risks of market failure that matter for both investors and
beneficiaries. As explained below, these risks must be addressed in
order to protect investor and beneficiary interests, as well as the
integrity of the market.
2.2. The Business Side: Impact Investors and Social Businesses
So how does social finance work? There are a few models but the
one that is most relevant for our purposes involves impact investors
putting their capital behind businesses that interface directly with
under-served populations by making socially beneficial goods and
services—including quality employment—available to them. This
model introduces the three main protagonists in the social finance

29 Michael Edwards, Who Gains, Who Loses? Distributional Impacts of the New
Philanthropic Marketplace, in NEW FRONTIERS OF PHILANTHROPY: A GUIDE TO THE NEW
TOOLS AND ACTORS RESHAPING GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY AND SOCIAL INVESTING 539,
546-47 (Lester M. Salamon, ed. 2014) [hereinafter Edwards].
30 Edwards, supra note 29, at 539.
31 Id. at 540.
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story: impact investors, social businesses, and crucially, the
beneficiaries.
2.2.1. Impact Investors
Impact investors are varied and have varying expectations of
social and financial returns. A brief overview of the composition of
the GIIN Investors Council illustrates this point. The Council
comprises private foundations (e.g., Rockefeller Foundation, W.K.
Kellogg Foundation, and Citi Foundation), institutional investors,
financial services firms, wealth managers (e.g., Prudential, TIAACREF, Morgan Stanley, UBS, Big Society Capital, and J.P. Morgan),
non-profit investment funds (e.g., National Community Investment
Fund and Root Capital), and development finance institutions (e.g.,
the Inter-American Development Bank and the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation).32 Individuals who buy shares in social
businesses or who make equity or loan investments in such
enterprises are another type of impact investor. This type of investor
might also invest in socially driven Kickstarter projects, or make
loans to micro-entrepreneurs in developing countries through
websites like Kiva.
Investors also have different expectations of return and different
motivations for engaging in social finance. While the common goal
is to generate social impact alongside financial returns, some
investors prioritize impact over financial gains, while others
prioritize financial gains. Thus, some are described as “impactfirst,” while others are described as “finance-first.”33 Over time, and
as the impact investing space has grown, these dichotomies have
become less clear-cut and more nuanced: “[F]und investors have
any number of reasons for their involvement in impact investing.
Their engagement can be informed by deeply-held values and
convictions; strategic institutional/mission priorities; rules and
regulations; or, of course, risk and return objectives.”34

EMERGING ASSET CLASS, supra note 20, at 16.
MONITOR, supra note 19, at 31.
34 INSIGHT AT PACIFIC COMMUNITY VENTURES ET AL., IMPACT INVESTING 2.0: THE
WAY FORWARD (2013), available at http://www.pacificcommunityventures.org/
impinv2/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/2013FullReport_sngpg.v8.pdf.
32
33
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A central contention of this article is that, even though it is not
always clear what drives investors, and even though there is an
understandable eagerness to be inclusive in efforts to attract
additional investment into the social finance space, it is nevertheless
important to be selective about which investors should be invited
under the impact umbrella. The less investors care about their
investments achieving a positive social impact, the less likely they
are to offer meaningful support to their investees in fulfilling their
social mission. Furthermore, the less investors care about positive
social outcomes, the more likely they are to pressure investees to
prioritize profitability over impact. Both of these situations are
problematic because they can harm beneficiaries.
In other words, investor motivations matter and investor
selectivity is a powerful mechanism for attracting the “right” type of
investor into the social finance space and for ensuring the health and
safety of the market for social impact. How one might go about
designing and operationalizing such a selection mechanism is a
question that will be addressed in the discussion on SSEs below.
2.2.2. Social Businesses
The businesses that receive impact investments are referred to as
“social businesses,” “social enterprises,”35 or “inclusive
businesses.”36 For convenience, I mostly use the first term. Social
businesses aim to achieve multiple bottom line returns by profitably,
expanding access to needed goods and services for under-served

35 For a definition of social entrepreneurs, see Alex Nicholls, Social Enterprise
and Social Entrepreneurs, CIVIL SOCIETY 148 (2d ed, Polity, 2009); see generally REPORT
OF THE UN COMMISSION ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND DEVELOPMENT TO THE SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, UNLEASHING ENTREPRENEURSHIP: MAKING
BUSINESS
WORK
FOR
THE
POOR
(2004),
available
at
http://web.undp.org/cpsd/documents/report/english/fullreport.pdf.
36 One article describes the difference as follows: “Social enterprises are forprofit entities with a mission to address social, environmental or otherwise
development-related needs. An inclusive business, on the other hand, contributes
to poverty reduction through the inclusion of low-income communities in its value
chain.” Pete Troilo, Are Social Stock Exchanges The Great Equalizer to Democratize
Development Finance?, DEVEXIMPACT (July 12, 2013), https://www.devex.com/en/
news/are-social-stock-exchanges-the-great-equalizer-to-democratizedevelopment-finance [hereinafter Troilo].
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populations.37 For these entities, creating positive social impact is a
core component of the business model; that is, social impact is the
business.38 In principle, the better a social business is at solving
problems and pursuing its mission, the more successful it will be,
both financially and socially.39
MFIs are the leading example of social businesses that serve the
poor in developing countries. These institutions make small loans
available to the poor, and are pioneers in the pursuit of double
bottom line returns, having done so since (at least) the 1970s.40 They
cater to individuals who would otherwise not be able to access credit
because they do not meet loan eligibility requirements.41 To clarify,
for many conventional banks, it is difficult to lend to individuals
who have neither credit history nor collateral to secure the loan in
case of a default, which is the case for most micro-borrowers.42 It is
also more expensive and burdensome to lend small amounts of
money to a multitude of borrowers, rather than make larger loans to
a smaller number of (more affluent) borrowers.43 This challenge is
compounded when borrowers are located in hard to reach areas,
such as scattered rural villages.44
In contrast to conventional lenders, MFIs are designed to cater
precisely to this difficult-to-service population, and in doing so they
fill an important need.45 By making financial services available to
the under-served, MFIs fill a credit gap that discriminates against
EMERGING ASSET CLASS, supra note 20, at 8.
Cummings, infra note 60, at 581-582. See also, SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://socialstockexchange.com/faqs/(explaining
that Corporate Social Responsibility describes activities through which companies
give back to society (e.g., via charitable donations, volunteer staff, and
commitments to reduce waste), but do not constitute the companies’ core.).
39 Eldar, infra note 78 at 17 (explaining that whereas donative organizations
transfer subsidies by simply giving goods to beneficiaries (e.g. bed nets or water
purifiers), social enterprises employ capital to produce goods and services for sale
and depend on their patrons to remain commercially sustainable).
40 BEYOND THE PIONEER, supra note 6, at 21-29.
41 Todd Arena, Social Corporate Governance and the problem of Mission Drift in
Socially-Oriented Microfinance Institutions, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 269, 270-73
n.108 (2008) [hereinafter Arena].
42 Id. at 278.
43 Id.
44 BEYOND THE PIONEER, supra note 6, at 7.
45 Eldar, infra note 78 at 8-9 (describing the main benefit that MFIs confer on
beneficiaries as the “opportunity to borrow” and social businesses as those that
transact with beneficiaries who cannot transact with profit-maximizing firms).
37
38
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the poor. Having access to credit makes it possible for microborrowers to invest in improving their own livelihoods, which they
can do through the purchase of goods and services like food, school
books, or medical visits; borrowers could also use the loan to buy a
piece of equipment like a cell phone charger that they “rent” out to
others for a fee, a sewing machine, or livestock to start a business
and generate income.46 Some MFIs also fill a social development gap
by providing financial literacy training and other social
programming designed to “empower” borrowers to make better use
of the financial services the MFI provides.47
MFIs are an important reference for understanding what it
means to operate as a social business because they are designed to
be both socially impactful and financially profitable, and many are
quite profitable. This is because the loans that they extend must be
repaid, and often at a high rate of interest. Globally, the median
interest yield was 27% in 2011, with an even higher Annual
Percentage Rate, and some MFIs charge over 100%.48
Aravind Eye Care System is an Indian non-profit that also works
in the health sector. It makes affordable blindness-prevention
surgery available to poor patients. It performs about 350,000 eye
operations per year, 60%of which are delivered at low or no cost.49
Aravind encompasses a network of hospitals and clinics that charge
market rates to patients who can afford to pay the full price in order
to subsidize or completely waive fees for patients who cannot.50
In the energy sector, Husk Power Systems transforms rice husks
into electricity and sells “micro-power” to over 200,000 individuals
in rural communities across India.51 Users are charged a variable fee
46 See, e.g., Kiva Borrowers, available at http://www.kiva.org/lend (providing
examples of the types of activities that micro-loans can finance).
47 Arena, supra note 41, at 281, 49.
48 RICHARD ROSENBURG ET AL., MICROCREDIT INTEREST RATES AND THEIR
DETERMINANTS – 2004 TO 2011, (Reports by CGAP and its Partners, No. 7, 2013)
[hereinafter CGAP]; see also, Neil MacFarquhar, Banks Making Big Profits from Tiny
Loans, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/04/14/world/14microfinance.html?pagewanted=all [hereinafter Big Profits];
Elizabeth Rhyne, Why Are Microfinance Rates So High?, HUFFINGTON POST, May 28,
2011, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elisabeth-rhyne/why-aremicrofinance-inte_b_593359.html.
49 TRACEY VICKERS & ELLEN ROSEN, DRIVING DOWN THE COST OF HIGH QUALITY
CARE: LESSONS FROM THE ARAVIND EYECARE SYSTEM 19 (Health International, No. 11,
2011), available at http://www.aravind.org/Downloads/draravindinterview.pdf.
50 Id.
51 Husk
Power
Systems,
ACUMEN
(Aug.
17,
2014),
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depending on the type and size of appliance they need to power.52
Husk increases access to electricity in areas that are under-served by
public utilities. This makes doing business easier and cheaper for
enterprises that depend on a reliable supply of electricity to support
their operations. Access to electricity also makes it possible for
households to power necessary appliances, such as lamps that
children can study under at night.53 Husk also contributes to the
local economy by training locals to operate the power plants and
training women to make incense with the husk ash, which can then
be sold to increase household income.54 Finally, electricity is both
cleaner and greener as a power source than kerosene, which is
beneficial to the health of both individual users and the planet.55
Some social businesses focus on creating and expanding
employment opportunities for beneficiaries. For these entities, the
social mission is job creation and workplace development. The
beneficiary focus is on individuals who are at a disadvantage in the
labor force due to some sort of vulnerability, such as a physical
disability or a disadvantageous immigration status.56
In the employment area, Hot Bread Kitchen (HBK) is a bakery in
New York City (NYC) that recruits hard-to-employ immigrant
women to make baked goods. The revenues from the sale of those
goods are used to fund skill-building programs in order to help
employees graduate to more senior positions in the food industry:
“[HBK] combines two traditionally separate models: a social welfare
model that guides its workforce development mission and a revenue
generation model that guides its commercial activities.”57 This
business model is clearly inspired by worker cooperatives, where
resources are pooled and redistributed among members.

http://acumen.org/investment/husk-power-systems/.
52 ASHDEN AWARDS, CASE STUDY SUMMARY: HUSK POWER SYSTEMS INDIA (2011),
available at http://www.ashden.org/files/Husk%20winner.pdf (explaining that a
basic connection supplies two 15WCFL lights and phone charging for US$2.20 per
month).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See Eldar, infra note 78, at 13 (referring to these social businesses as Work
Integration Social Enterprises that hire disadvantaged employees who suffer from
“systemic unemployment”).
57 Hybrid Ideal, supra note 7, at 51.
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Another example of an employment-focused social business is
Goodwill Industries. Goodwill collects donated and used clothing,
which it resells at Goodwill stores. The proceeds from the sales are
used, in part, to fund job-training and placement programs for the
communities serviced by any one of the 165 Goodwill agencies
working across the U.S. and Canada.58
2.2.3. Social Business 2.0: Make it Legal-ish
Certain social businesses commit to a double or triple bottom
line business model through their legal structures. For example, in
the U.S., companies can signal their commitment to advancing the
interests of both shareholders and stakeholders—both the
community that is directly served by the entity or its target
beneficiaries and the environment—by incorporating as a “benefit
corporation.” The first state to adopt a benefit corporation statute
was Maryland, in 2010, and 30 States (including Delaware) have
since followed suit.59 Similarly, in the U.K., businesses can
incorporate as Community Interest Corporations, or CICs, whose
activities are “for the benefit of the community.”60 CICs were first
established as part of the Companies Act in 2004 and are overseen
by a dedicated CIC Regulator.61
Benefit corporations are relatively new creatures on the
corporate landscape. As a result, it is still rather early to assess their
compliance with applicable rules. Nevertheless, initial studies have
found that compliance with benefit corporation reporting

58 See GOODWILL INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., THE GOOD BUSINESS MODEL
GOODWILL, available at http://www.goodwill.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/
12/Goodwills-Successful-Social-Enterprise-Model.pdf
(discussing
the
employment-focused “social enterprise” business model of Goodwill Industries).
59 Benefit
Corp.,
State
by
State
Status
of
Legislation,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Aug. 12,
2015).
60 Matthew F.
Doeringer, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and
International Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 313 (2010) [hereinafter
Doeringer]; see also Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations−−A Sustainable Form
of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 593 (2011); Briana Cummings, Benefit
Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote the Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 578, 586 (2012) [hereinafter Cummings].
61 Doeringer, supra note 60, at 312.
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requirements is “abysmal,” at less than 10%.62 Perhaps because the
Secretaries of State are under-resourced and still unfamiliar with the
workings of benefit corporation law, there has been little or no
enforcement on the government side. 63 Further, enforcement by
stakeholders wanting to bring a claim against a benefit corporation
is limited to the so-far untested device of Benefit Enforcement
Proceedings. And, since automatic standing for such proceedings is
given only to shareholders, directors, and owners of 5% or more of
the equity in the benefit corporation’s parent company, stakeholders
will likely remain “relatively helpless in enforcing their rights.”64
As a dedicated agency that has been active for over ten years, the
CIC Regulator has considerably more experience overseeing social
businesses than its U.S. counterparts. In general, CIC rules are more
detailed, stringent, developed, and better enforced than benefit
corporation rules. We will return to them below in the discussion
on improving SSE regulation—in particular, the limitations on
dividends and on the transfer of CIC assets. CIC rules are also more
advanced with respect to the tax treatment of CIC investments and
experiments are underway to provide tax relief to CIC investors,65 a
prospect that remains distant for U.S. investors.
As concerns enforcement, the CIC Regulator has removed over
three thousand CICs from its register over the course of eight years
for various reasons, including failure to file accounts in a timely
manner and failure to file statutory documents.66 The CIC Regulator
62 Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2) (draft on file with author) (collecting benefic
corporation compliance data and putting claims about heightened transparency
into question).
63 Id. (manuscript at 20) (referencing Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 301(a),
305(c), which lists seven groups of stakeholders that directors must consider,
including shareholders, employees, customers, community, and environment).
64 Id.
65 See Finance Act, 2014, c. 26, § 57, schs. 11 & 12 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/26/pdfs/ukpga_20140026_en.pdf
(granting income tax relief to individuals who invest in social enterprises); see also
CABINET OFFICE, HM REVENUE AND CUSTOMS, & HM TREASURY, GUIDANCE: SOCIAL
INVESTMENT
TAX
RELIEF
(2015),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-investment-tax-relieffactsheet/social-investment-tax-relief (“Social investment tax relief (SITR) is
the government’s tax relief for social investment which encourages
individuals to support social enterprises and helps them access new sources of
finance.”).
66 THE OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES,
CIC/14/972, ANNUAL REPORT 2013/2014, at 22-23, available at https://www.gov.
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also provides a mechanism through which individual stakeholders
(e.g. customers, community members, or employees) can file
complaints against CICs.67 It bears noting that such complaints
doubled between 2013 and 2014.68 The Regulator has the power to
investigate and act on complaints that fall under its purview, for
example by de-registering a CIC or mandating a wind down.
On the non-legal or voluntary end of the social regulation
spectrum, businesses anywhere in the world can choose to undergo
the “B Impact Assessment” created by a U.S. non-profit, B Lab, and
obtain a certification as a B (for “benefit”) Corporation.69 This
certification can be included on product packaging and company
promotional materials. Some of the better-known B-certified
businesses in the U.S. include Cabot Creamery Cooperative, Method
Products, Ben and Jerry’s Homemade Holdings, and Warby
Parker.70
Because certification schemes are voluntary, there is relatively
little to say about legal enforcement. This should not be taken to
mean that certifications have no regulatory power, however. In the
case of B Corporation Certifications, companies must achieve a
minimum score on the impact assessment; every two years,
companies can renew their certification by undergoing the
assessment again and verifying that their performance remains in
line with B Lab’s standards.71 If, at the two-year renewal period, a
company’s score falls below the required minimum, the certification
will not be renewed and the company will be “de-certified.”72 In B
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/330648/CIC14-972_-regulator-of-community-interest-companies-annual-report-2013-2014.pdf
[hereinafter CIC ANNUAL REPORT 2013/2014].
67 THE OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES,
COMPLAINTS ABOUT COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES (2009), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/463751/09-1650-commumity-interest-companies-complaint-about-cicsleaflet.pdf.
68 CIC ANNUAL REPORT 2013/2014, supra note 66, at 24.
69 WHAT ARE B CORPS?, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps (last
visited Feb. 28, 2015).
70 B CORP COMMUNITY, http://www.bcorporation.net/b-corp-community (last
visited Feb. 28, 2015).
71 B
LAB
PERFORMANCE
REQUIREMENTS,
https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-bcorp/performance-requirements (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
72 Email Interview with Staff Member, Katie Holcomb, Director of
Communications, B Lab (Oct. 3, 2015) (email on file with author) [hereinafter
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Lab’s experience, only 2-3% of B Corps have been de-certified, either
due to performance or because they went out of business or just
opted to leave “the community.”73
These figures indicate that, while there are no legal
consequences attached to non-compliance, compliance with
certification requirements is nevertheless high. This is not entirely
surprising given that the types of entities that seek out—and pay
for—a certification are typically also invested in keeping it. Still, the
initial findings suggest that the prospect of reputational rather than
legal liability has real regulatory power and that voluntary regimes
can sometimes be more effective at regulating subscribers than
official regulation.
The emergence of new corporate forms like CICs and benefit
corporations is relevant for a few reasons. First, it shows the degree
to which policy and lawmakers support the idea of deploying
private capital and business acumen to improve social welfare.
Second, these new forms highlight the importance of corporate
law—both hard and soft—for the regulation of social businesses
and, by extension, social finance. While this article is more focused
on securities regulation, corporate law—particularly social
enterprise law—is also critical for upgrading the social regulatory
framework. This article draws heavily on the lessons (being)
learned in the corporate arena to formulate recommendations for
improving SSE regulatory performance.
Third, the CIC and benefit corporation models allow
comparisons between official government approaches to regulation
and other approaches, such as private certification schemes and
SSEs. The juxtaposition of official and private—and voluntary—
regulation is helpful for understanding how norms travel between
the public and private spheres, changing both in the process. It also
helps for understanding how new markets, such as the market for
social impact, can become regulated through a combination of
public and private rules. Indeed, social finance regulation is a
natural subject for “new governance” scholars who “challenge the
conventional wisdom that effective regulation should involve topdown and command-and-control rules, while rejecting a complete
shift . . . toward pure market or self-regulation.”74 SSEs fit here
Interview with B Lab staff member].
73 Id.
74 Tamara C. Belifanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, DEL. J. CORP.
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because they establish a private voluntary framework for regulating
social businesses and investors that is very much in conversation
with official regulation.
To summarize, impact investors and social businesses are not
homogenous. They come in different shapes and sizes and provide
a wide range of products and services. Crucially, they have different
expectations of financial and social return. Though social businesses
and investors share an intention to achieve both social impact and
financial returns, mere intent is not enough to truly differentiate
them from their conventional counterparts. Yet, if the market for
social impact is to have integrity, the distinctions between social and
conventional must be meaningful. Both official and voluntary
regulatory regimes have an important role to play in making such
distinctions real. While the promise of blending social and financial
imperatives has a “beguiling charm,”75 it is also volatile because
maintaining equilibrium between the different involved interests is
a delicate task. This is of particular concern when businesses are in
a position to profit from the poor and generate financial returns
through transactions with disadvantaged populations, as discussed
below.
2.3. The Beneficiaries
Social finance beneficiaries are those whose lives should be
improved by social businesses and impact investments. This group
is comprised of a heterogeneous population of billions, residing all
over the world—both in rich and poor countries.76 In spite of the
many differences in geographical location, culture, ethnicity, and
race (to name a few), social finance beneficiaries share a few
L., 786, 801 (2014) [hereinafter Belifanti]; see also Kevin Kolben, Transnational Labor
Regulation and the Limits of Governance, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 403, 436-37
(2011) (arguing that the governance models applied to transnational labor
regulation are not suitable for developing states and proposing alternatives).
75 Cummings, supra note 60, at 627.
76 See generally NEXT 4 BILLION, supra note 5. Even though most of the BoP
literature focuses on emerging markets, similar “market opportunities” also exist at
the lower end of the income spectrum in rich countries, for example, in the housing
and financial sectors. See Adrian Wooldridge, The Bottom Of The Pyramid: Businesses
Are Learning To Serve The Growing Number Of Hard-Up Americans, THE ECONOMIST,
June 23, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18863898 (“But even in one of
the world’s richest countries the hard-up represent a huge and growing market.”).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/4

2015]

REGULATING SOCIAL FINANCE

165

important characteristics—including, most importantly, some form
of vulnerability.77
For our purposes, it helps to separate beneficiaries into two
general categories. The first is comprised of individuals who
purchase goods and services from a social business or who work for
such a business. I refer to these individuals as CustomerBeneficiaries and Worker-Beneficiaries, respectively. 78 The second
category is comprised of individuals who simply receive social
goods and services (for free) through initiatives that make
innovative use of the capital markets to finance social goods and
services (e.g. vaccinations79 and pre-release programs for
prisoners80). I refer to these individuals as Pure-Beneficiaries. This
article is primarily concerned with the beneficiaries that fall under
the first category, meaning those who transact with market-based
providers to access social goods and services.
In developing countries, this demographic is targeted by the
“BoP proposition,” which maintains that there are vast untapped
resources at the bottom of the economic pyramid that can be
profitably harnessed by selling goods and services to the poor.81 The
77 Kirk Davidson, Ethical Concerns at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Where CSR Meets
BOP, 2 J. INT’L BUS. ETHICS 22, 28-29 (2009).
78 Other scholars use similar terms. See Ofer Eldar, The Role of Social Enterprise
and Hybrid Organizations (John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy
Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 485, 2014) [hereinafter Eldar] (referring
to individuals who purchase goods and services from a social enterprise or who
provide input or labor to such a business as “patron-beneficiaries”).
79 For example, the International Financing Facility for Immunizations issues
government-backed bonds on capital markets to finance vaccination programs in
developing countries.
Bond proceeds are transferred to a public-private
partnership, the GAVI Alliance, which then distributes funds to developing
country governments to support national health programs. OVERVIEW,
http://www.iffim.org/about/overview/ (last visited August 17, 2015).
80 For example, Social Finance, Inc. in the U.K. issued the first social impact
bond in 2010, raising about $8 million from 17 investors. Target beneficiaries
comprise three thousand prisoners who are approaching release. Proceeds are used
to fund recidivism reduction programs and investor returns are measured in
proportion to the government savings brought about by lowered recidivism.
SOCIAL FINANCE, INC., A NEW TOOL FOR SCALING IMPACT: HOW SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS
CAN MOBILIZE PRIVATE CAPITAL TO ADVANCE SOCIAL GOOD (2012), at 9, available at
http://www.socialfinanceus.org/sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/small.SocialFina
nceWPSingleFINAL.pdf. N.Y.C. recently established a similar program with a cityguaranteed loan from Goldman Sachs. David W. Chen, Goldman to Invest in City
Jail Program, Profiting if Recidivism Falls Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2012, at A14.
81 “The poor” is technically defined as the 2.5 billion people who live on less
than $2 per day. Aneel Karnani, Romanticizing the Poor, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV.
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idea is that, by meeting BoP demand, businesses can profit from
developing a new consumer base and contribute to poverty
The “win-win” approach that drives the BoP
alleviation.82
proposition resonates deeply among social finance proponents who
seek to mainstream the notion that businesses can do well by doing
good.
There is also significant overlap between the BoP proposition
and social finance in terms of how they are criticized. Specifically,
Karnani cautions that “fighting poverty with business” treads on
dangerous ethical ground because of problematic assumptions
about poor people: “Proponents of these market solutions assume
that poor people are fully capable and willing participants in free
market economies” and that they are “well-informed and rational
economic actors.”83 In reality, he explains, “the poor lack education,
information, and other economic, cultural, and social capital that
would allow them to take advantage of—and shield themselves
against—the vagaries of the free market.”84 This critique highlights
the vulnerability-enhancing effects of bringing the market to the BoP
and vice versa. The combination of financial and non-financial
poverty renders these new “consumers” relatively easy to exploit.
This is aggravated by the fact that the market is unpredictable,
especially when it comes to advancing non-financial objectives, like
social welfare.
Beneficiaries are also vulnerable in the sense that they lack
cushioning to absorb mistakes. They can’t “afford a reversal of
fortune generated by a loss, economic or other” brought about by an
abusive transaction: “The consequences of bad choices are bad for
everyone, but even worse for the poor, who lack the resources—
financial, psychological, social, and political—to compensate for
their errors.”85 It is, therefore, especially “important that inclusive
38, 38 (2009) [hereinafter Karnani].
82 See NEXT 4 BILLION, supra note 5, at 3 (“New empirical measures of [lowincome consumers’] aggregate purchasing power . . . suggest significant
opportunities for market-based approaches to better meet their needs”); C.K.
PRAHALAD, FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID: ERADICATING POVERTY
THROUGH PROFITS (2004) (explaining how companies can profit from catering to the
poor).
83 Karnani, supra note 81, at 38-40.
84 Id. at 40; BEYOND THE PIONEER, supra note 6, at 7.
85 Ted London, A Base-of-the-Pyramid Perspective on Poverty Alleviation 32
(William Davidson Inst./Stephen M. Ross Sch. of Bus. at the Univ. of Mich.,
Working Paper No. 31, 2007).
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industries should always be vigilant on the question of impact on
the poor—while we have described the position of the poor as
customers or producers in relation to these business models, they
are also the intended beneficiaries from an impact perspective.”86
The events in Andhra Pradesh show that poor vigilance can have
tragic consequences.
As suggested above, one way to differentiate among
beneficiaries is to make a distinction based on the nature of the
beneficiary-social business relationship. Thus, the CustomerBeneficiary pays for social goods while the Worker-Beneficiary
works for social goods. As an example of the former, consider the
individual borrower of a microfinance loan. The typical microborrower is female and poor in both financial and non-financial
terms. These characteristics tend to exclude her from access to
conventional financial services and also subject her to various forms
of social marginalization. She is a customer in the sense that she
does not simply receive money from an MFI,87 rather, she receives a
loan that she must repay with interest—probably at a relatively high
rate.88 The social good here is access to finance, as well as,
depending on the MFI, financial literacy training and other
programs designed to empower borrowers to make good use of
borrowed funds.89 Micro-borrowers are one type of CustomerBeneficiary who buys a social good (e.g. credit) from a social
business (e.g. an MFI).
Customer-Beneficiaries also include individuals who buy goods
that are designed to affordably meet needs and improve lives.
Examples of such goods include affordable housing; micro-power—
electricity sold in small increments to power a single appliance;
water filtration devices, which are especially in demand in poor
rural areas; joint cell phone ownership schemes; “clean” cook stoves
that carry health and environmental benefits; individualized
packets of laundry detergent that contribute to improving health
and sanitation; and other goods and services that are sold in microquantities or on a sliding scale like the Aravind eye surgeries. In
BEYOND THE PIONEER, supra note 6, at 76.
Eldar, supra note 78, at 17.
88 CGAP, supra note 48; Big Profits, supra note 48.
89 Arena, supra note 41, at 275-76 (describing “socially-oriented” MFIs as
entities that “bundle non-financial services, typically educational or social services
with financial services”).
86
87

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

168

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:1

each case, the Customer-Beneficiary must pay for the social good at
issue in order to access benefits not made available through ordinary
markets.
Moving to Worker-Beneficiaries, these individuals work to
access the social good, which is quality employment. Consider the
employees of HBK described earlier, “foreign born low income
These
women” from non-English speaking countries.90
characteristics make it difficult to find employment at a
conventional business. And, even if alternative employment were
found, it is unlikely that it would pay a living wage or that it would
afford these women the “benefits necessary to live a dignified life.”91
This explains why HBK’s founder describes the people in her target
group as “the most vulnerable workers in the labor force.”92 In
addition to a salary, HBK employees benefit from training in baking
and language classes, and can also receive support for their own
projects, all of which should facilitate graduating to higher paying
jobs in the NYC food industry.93 As indicated above, similar
employment initiatives exist for people with disabilities or people
coming out of prison. Worker-Beneficiaries therefore work to access
social goods provided by a social business, namely, quality
employment (at least a living wage with benefits, such as skillbuilding programs).
As this typology suggests, social finance beneficiaries are not
passive in their interactions with social businesses. Rather, they are
active, either as customers or as employees. While beneficiaries
have power—limited as it may be—to choose the social business(es)
with which they transact, it is important not to confuse choice with
invulnerability. Social finance beneficiaries are identified as such
precisely because they are excluded from the conventional
marketplace as a result of financial or non-financial disadvantage—
or a combination. This means that the social business-beneficiary
dynamic is charged with vulnerability, and measures must be taken
90 HOT BREAD KITCHEN: ABOUT US, http://hotbreadkitchen.org/about-us/ourmission (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
91 Jessamyn W. Rodriguez, 72 Ways To Change the World, EATER, http://www.
eater.com/a/72-ways-food-can-change-the-world/jessamyn-rodriguez
(last
visited Feb. 28, 2015).
92 Jessamyn W. Rodriguez, Now IS the Time, HOT BREAD KITCHEN (Feb. 21, 2013),
http://hotbreadkitchen.org/now-is-the-time.
93 HOT BREAD KITCHEN: OUR MISSION, http://hotbreadkitchen.org/aboutus/our-mission (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).
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to ensure that beneficiaries are not rendered more vulnerable or
exploited through their transactions. SSEs are important vehicles for
designing and implementing such measures. In a future piece, I will
also consider the possibilities for regulating social finance through
an upgraded consumer protection framework designed to better
protect the ultra-vulnerable, meaning those Pure-Beneficiaries
transitioning from relying on government assistance (domestic and
international) to meet basic needs to being consumers in an underregulated market place of private providers.
Social businesses and their investors are heterogeneous, a
feature that should be welcomed in so far as it leads to a more
diverse—and better-funded—array of social problem-solving
initiatives. But vigilance is required to ensure that commercial
interests remain aligned with those of the already-vulnerable
beneficiaries. These individuals occupy a precarious position within
the market for social impact: They are both beneficiaries of lifeimproving initiatives and the source of profitability for those
initiatives. While it may not be realistic to expect conventional
businesses (and their investors) to make accommodations for their
customers’ or their employees’ vulnerability, the ethical and moral
imperative for social businesses to do so is very strong indeed. The
risk of interest misalignment must be regulated to protect
beneficiaries and, by extension, the integrity of social finance.

3. THE REGULATORY CHALLENGE: HYBRIDITY
This Part draws attention to the special hybridity feature of
social finance in order to show how social finance can “go wrong,”
breaking its social promise. It clarifies how the commercialization
of social businesses can aggravate the risk of mission drift, which is
inherent in entities that operate on double or triple bottom line
business models.94 It calls for regulating hybridity and explains why
SSEs have a potentially important role to play in this regard.

94 Tim Hindle, Triple Bottom Line, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 2009), http://
www.economist.com/node/14301663.
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3.1. Social-Financial Hybridity
Social finance is replete with hybridity. Some even refer to a
“hybridization movement,” the essence of which is “a fundamental
convergence and reconfiguration of the social and commercial
sectors, from completely separate fields to a common space.”95 As
explained above, impact investors and social businesses are driven
by two motives or “masters:”96 financial sustainability/profitability
and social impact. As distinct from philanthropy and public
assistance, social finance is not ‘free’ in the sense that investors and
social businesses expect returns consisting of some combination of
financial and social gain. This duality makes impact investors and
social businesses different from conventional commercial investors
and corporations, respectively; it also distinguishes them from
charitable foundations and non-profit organizations, respectively.
Due to its hybridity, social finance does not fit neatly into existing
regulatory regimes, like securities regulation or charities regulation.
In this sense, it defies the regulatory expectations of lawyers who are
used to being able to segregate different areas of economic activity
into different regulatory schemes.
Social finance is characterized by a kind of “expectationhybridity.” Investors expect investee social businesses to generate
multiple bottom line returns. Similarly, social businesses expect that
the financing they receive will be hybrid or “patient capital,”97
meaning financing that does not chase short-term financial returns,
but rather adjusts in support of the enterprise’s core social mission.
In other words, social businesses expect investments to “align with
their goal of creating both social and economic value.”98 The
expectations of beneficiaries are also hybrid. Social finance
beneficiaries harbor the expectations of a conventional customer or
employee, but also those of consumers of public or non-profit
services:
Hybrid Ideal, supra note 7, at 55.
See John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A
Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 141 (2010)
(describing the “dual purposes” of low-profit limited liability companies).
97 ACUMEN FUND, supra note 10; Jacqueline Novogratz, Making a Case for Patient
Capital,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
MAGAZINE
(Oct.
10,
2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/making-a-case-for-patient-capital10202011.html.
98 Hybrid Ideal, supra note 7, at 55.
95
96
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Traditional businesses usually think of their consumers as
customers, whereas traditional nonprofits think of their
consumer base as beneficiaries. Hybrids, however, break
this traditional customer-beneficiary dichotomy by
providing products and services that, when consumed,
produce social value. When consumption yields both
revenue and social value, customers and beneficiaries may
become indistinguishable.99
Social finance is also marked by “value-hybridity.” The
combination of social and financial objectives affects the definition
of return on investment (“ROI”). Indeed, the very concept of value
is hybrid in the social finance space. This is illustrated by Jed
Emerson’s “blended value proposition,” which states that
[A]ll organizations, whether for-profit or not, create value
that consists of economic, social and environmental value
components—and that investors simultaneously generate all
three forms of value when they provide capital to
organizations. The outcome of all this activity is value
creation and that value is itself non-divisible and, therefore,
a blend of these three elements.100
For subscribers to the blended value proposition, value is
inherently hybrid, a mix of social, environmental, and financial
outputs. From this perspective, corporate entities, whether forprofit or non-profit, do not produce only one or another type of
value; instead, they produce all three simultaneously in greater or
smaller proportion to one-another.
3.2. Measuring Social Impact: A Complicated Proposition
How does one measure impact or Social ROI? This question is
central to the entire discourse around social finance and impact
investing. To help answer it, this section provides an introduction
to two tools that have been designed specifically to capture (and
score) the social impact produced by social businesses: the Impact
Id. at 53.
Jed Emerson, The Blended Value Proposition: Integrating Social and Financial
Returns, 45 CAL. MGMT. REV. 35, 44 (2003).
99

100
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Reporting and Investment Standards (IRIS) and the Global Impact
Investing Rating System (GIIRS).101
IRIS, a free public good, supplies a glossary of terms that equips
users anywhere in the world with vocabulary for engaging in social
finance activities. It provides standard definitions for terms like
“full time employment,” which some businesses may claim to create
(“[f]ull-time paid employees work year round and typically work
35-50 hours per week. If local definitions of full-time equivalency
differ, use appropriate standard”); “low income area” which many
social businesses claim to serve (“[a] geographic area
(neighborhood, village, other region) where the median family
income is less than 80% of the median family income of the
surrounding vicinity”); or “affordable housing,” which some
businesses claim to provide (“[h]ousing for which the associated
financial costs are at a level that does not threaten other basic needs
and represents a reasonable proportion of an individual’s overall
income.”.102 IRIS also provides a menu of performance metrics for
different types of impact investments, such as investments in
housing, agriculture, financial services, or water. For example, a
housing developer might consider tracking the percentage of
affordable housing units created, the number of individuals housed,
or the number of new businesses created as a result of the
development.103
Businesses can select the metrics that are most relevant for their
area of work, and then track their own social performance. The data
could then be included in financial and social reports, or it could be
used for operational purposes, to set new company policy. For
instance, an MFI looking to upgrade its reporting might choose to
disclose the Effective Interest Rate charged to borrowers, the
number of borrowers per loan officer, or the number of loans
disbursed during the reporting period.104 Should these figures
101 IRIS: Introduction, https://iris.thegiin.org/introduction (last visited Feb.
28, 2015); see also Sarah Dadush, Impact Investment Indicators: A Critical Assessment,
IN GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH QUANTIFICATION AND
RANKINGS 392, 402-11 (Davis et al. eds., 2012) (evaluating the challenges of
measuring social impact through tools such as the GIIRS and IRIS) [hereinafter
Dadush].
102 IRIS: GLOSSARY, https://iris.thegiin.org/glossary (last visited Sept. 12,
2015).
103 IRIS: GETTING STARTED WITH IRIS, https://iris.thegiin.org/guide/gettingstarted-guide (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
104 IRIS Metrics, Financial Services: Microfinance, GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING
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exceed an industry-recommended, statutory, or firm-imposed
maximum, the MFI could make adjustments. The metrics could also
be used by management to decide what firm-wide policies and
standards to adopt, which in turn could inform firm thinking on the
social mission.
Taking IRIS a step further, GIIRS serves a judgment function by
aggregating IRIS-compliant data into an overall impact rating. The
ratings are in the form of a star score—companies can receive one to
five stars—and a percentage score, based on a maximum score
achievable for a set of industry-specific questions.105 GIIRS is
independent of the entities it rates and the ratings are intended to
reduce due diligence costs for investors. IRIS and GIIRS and other
such tools106 produce needed “market intelligence” by generating
information about the impact investing market and about specific
investment opportunities.107
IRIS and GIIRS are important contributors to a process I refer to
as “blueprinting.” I will explore the workings and limitations of
blueprinting in depth in a future article, but some fundamentals are
set out here to better frame the challenges facing SSEs. Blueprinting
happens when a new market, such as the market for social finance,
is created based on a template that is set by an already-existing
market, such as the market for conventional finance. It explains the
routine description of social finance as the social analog to
NETWORK,
https://iris.thegiin.org/metrics
(select
“Financial
services:
Microfinance” checkbox under “Sectors of Focus”).
105 GIIRS
ASSESSMENT
WEIGHTINGS
AND
STAR
RATINGS,
http://giirs.nonprofitsoapbox.com/about-giirs/how-giirs-works/165 (last visited
Sept. 12, 2015); see also Beth Richardson, Sparking Impact Investing Through GIIRS,
STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Oct. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Sparking Impact Investing]
(explaining that company ratings include (1) an overall rating; (2) an impact area
rating in the fields of “Governance,” “Workers,” “Community,” and
“Environment”; (3) detailed judgments on the company’s “Social or Environmental
Business Model”; (4) key industry specific performance indicators; and (5)
benchmarking based on the company’s geography, size and mission).
106 Other social performance tools include: the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI) – Sustainability Reporting Framework; Sustainable Livelihoods (SL),
Demonstrating Value (DV), and Social Return on Investment (SROI). See Global
Impact
Investing
Rating
System:
Related
Tools
and
Methods,
http://impactinvesting.marsdd.com/simt/global-impact-investing-ratingsystem-giirs/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Global Impact Investing].
107 Amit Bouri, How Standards Emerge: The Role of Investor Leadership in Realizing
the
Potential
of
IRIS,
6
INNOVATIONS
145,
146,
available
at
http://www.thegiin.org/binary-data/RESOURCE/download_file/000/000/2881.pdf.
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conventional finance, which can be traced in the vocabulary of social
finance, but also in the creation of new financial instruments and
institutions for administering social finance.
Thus, conventional investments convert into impact investments
in the social finance space,108 and conventional bonds become “social
impact bonds;”109 rather than traditional for-profit corporations we
now have benefit corporations and CICs; the financing for social
businesses can now come from specially constituted social finance
banks, such as Big Society Capital in the U.K.;110 and SSEs have
emerged as the social counterparts of CSEs. Last but not least, the
metrics developed for measuring financial performance in the
conventional context, such as ROI, become Social Return on
Investment (“SROI”), while IRIS is described as the social
counterpart of the International Financial Reporting Standards
(“IFRS”)111 of the United States. Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles, and GIIRS are described as the counterparts of S&P credit
risk ratings or Morningstar investment rankings.112 This systematic
mimicry is deliberate and intended to attract investment through the
strategic use of language, institutions, and metrics that are familiar
to investors, like banks, debt instruments, and stars.113
Seen in this light, IRIS and GIIRS are designed to facilitate the
conversion of conventional investors into impact investors.
However, as I have explained elsewhere, these tools have serious
deficiencies. Specifically, they fail actually to capture impact.114
Impact is defined as an improvement to a person’s life or a social
outcome caused by an intervention above and beyond what is

EMERGING ASSET CLASS, supra note 20.
For a detailed explanation of Social Impact Bonds, see Deborah Burand,
Globalizing Social Finance: How Social Impact Bonds and Social Impact Performance
Guarantees Can Scale Development, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 447 (2013), available at
http://www.nyujlb.org/wp-content/uploads/nyb_9-2_447-502_Burand.pdf.
110 BIG SOCIETY CAPITAL, http://www.bigsocietycapital.com (last visited Mar.
1, 2015).
111 Id.
112 Global Impact Investing, supra note 106.
113 Tom Stabile, Architects of a ‘Social Investment Data Engine,’ FINANCIAL TIMES,
Apr. 10, 2010; see also Margot Brandenburg & Sarah Gelfand, Impact Reporting and
Investment Standards—Comment Now!, NEXT BILLION (Nov.
2, 2009),
http://nextbillion.net/blogpost.aspx?blogid=1585 (explaining the reporting
standards for impact investing).
114 Id. at 423–24.
108
109
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attributable to other factors.115 Thus, when it comes to assessing
actual impact, the question is: What would have happened to a
person who participated in a program (taking a micro-loan, for
instance) if they had not done so? While this question may seem
simple, drawing a causal relationship between an intervention and
a social outcome is a fraught, expensive, and imprecise process; as a
result, most measurement tools fall short of actually measuring
impact.116 In balancing “the need for rigorous impact evaluation
against the need for simple, cost effective ways” of measuring social
impact, “[m]any impact investors . . . settle for measuring ‘activities’
or ‘outputs’ (such as the number of bednets sold) rather than
running control groups to measure the ‘impact’.”117
IRIS and GIIRS measure proxies for impact, meaning outputs
(e.g., the number of jobs created or clean cooking stoves sold or the
lifespan of a water filtration device).118 Similarly, rather than
evaluating the substantive feedback from the individuals who are
supposed to benefit from the services of a social business, IRIS and
GIIRS would only ask whether such feedback is sought and through
which mechanisms (e.g., annual stakeholder meetings or
anonymous surveys). The problem is that if information is limited
to proxies, it becomes difficult to determine whether a social
investment is in fact having a social impact. Conversely, it becomes
difficult to determine whether a particular positive (or negative)
social outcome can be attributed to a particular social investment.
As Morduch observes, rather than learning about the true
impact of an intervention, readers of IRIS reports “get numbers on
scale, outreach, costs, and revenues,” and proxies that are too

115 Syed Hashemi, Beyond Good Intentions: Measuring the Social Performance of
Microfinance Institutions, CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR at 3 (May 2007),
available
at
https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Focus-NoteBeyond-Good-Intentions-Measuring-the-Social-Performance-of-MicrofinanceInstitutions-May-2007.pdf.
116 Paul Brest & Kelly Born, Unpacking the Impact in Impact Investing, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV., Aug. 14, 2013 [hereinafter Brest], available at
http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/unpacking_the_impact_in_impact_inv
esting.
117 See EMERGING ASSET CLASS, supra note 20, at 72.
118 Jonathan Morduch, Not So Fast: The Realities of Impact Investing, AMERICAS
Q., Fall 2013, at 4 available at https://wagner.nyu.edu/files/faculty/publications/
Morduch_-_The_Realities_of_Impact_Investing_-_Americas_Quarterly_2011.pdf
[hereinafter Morduch].
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abstracted from the experience of beneficiaries to be useful.119 He
cautions that “[i]f impact investing is to evolve as a mature
development strategy, investors need to find ways to measure (and
be accountable for) true net impacts.”120 Yet, precisely because they
are charged with telling an ROI story that is accessible to a wide
range of investors, social performance metrics compromise on the
task of telling a complete and accurate story about social impact.
The proxy issue is compounded by the limited capacity of
quantitative tools to measure the experience of beneficiaries in the
form of greater “empowerment, tolerance, authenticity, solidarity,
and caring.”121
It bears noting that the proxy problem is by no means isolated to
the social finance space. Public assistance programs, international
development programs, philanthropic and civil society initiatives
frequently have difficulty with the question of how to properly
assess the social outcomes of their work.122 Even in these settings,
the pressure to quantify impact and to rely on (not-necessarilyreliable) metrics produces a range of perverse effects, including
steering funds toward businesses and projects that “score” well,
even if they don’t meaningfully improve lives. Such perversions are
troubling in the social provisioning sphere, writ large; however,
there is something particularly unsettling about an entire market
being built on the fiction that one can treat social impact like a
commodity that can be invested in, produced, exchanged, and
whose “value” can be quantitatively captured.
Though the developers of IRIS and GIIRS recognize these
limitations, their general response is that “the perfect is the enemy
of the good” and that these tools are so vital to the growth of the
impact investing market that the industry cannot afford to wait for
perfection; instead, they should be put to use now and improved
Id.
Id.
121 Edwards, supra note 29, at 542.
122 See generally Andrew Natsios, The Clash of the Counter-bureaucracy and
Development,
CTR.
FOR
GLOBAL
DEV
(2010),
available
at
http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1424271_file_Natsios_Counterbureau
cracy.pdf; see also Esther Duflo & Michael Kremer, Use of Randomization in the
Evaluation
of
Development
Effectiveness
(2003),
available
at
http://economics.mit.edu/files/765; KEVIN E. DAVIS, BENEDICT KINGSBURY & SALLY
ENGLE MERRY, Introduction: Global Governance by Indicators, in GOVERNANCE BY
INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH QUANTIFICATION AND RANKINGS (Davis et al.
eds., 2012).
119
120
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down the line with the benefit of experience.123 While this response
is understandable and, no doubt, well intentioned, for this author, it
makes little sense to rate or assess the social impact of a business
without taking the feedback from those whose lives are supposed to
be positively impact-ed into account.
Admittedly, there is no easy (or cheap) solution for improving
social impact metrics, especially given that the beneficiaries
themselves are heterogeneous and may bring conflicting interests
into play. However, as suggested in an earlier piece, one
recommendation would be to supplement the quantitative proxybased information with qualitative information that captures
something closer to beneficiaries’ lived experience of social
finance.124 Such information could be collected in the form of
interviews with beneficiaries or through feedback mechanisms (e.g.,
using
texting
to
survey
beneficiaries
or
register
complaints/compliments).125 The information collected would, of
course, need to be standardized for reporting purposes, but this
process should stay true to the goal of (heavily) counting beneficiary
experiences towards the assessment of social business’ performance.
Additionally, beneficiaries should, whenever possible, be directly
involved and consulted in developing impact assessment metrics, so
that it becomes clearer what positive impact looks like from their
perspective, rather than that of a business or a removed third-party
standard setter (e.g., B Lab, which developed GIIRS).126 Such
beneficiary-focused initiatives would paint a fuller, if not perfectly
reflective, picture of the impact actually generated by impact
investments.
This overview of social impact metrics shows that there are
serious problems with converting tools that were built for
conventional finance into tools for social finance. These limitations
are evident with metrics, but they also extend beyond to include
institutions like SSEs. Conventional finance is not built to
accommodate social concerns to the degree demanded by social
finance and its beneficiaries. Administrative institutions like SSEs
123 Global Impact Investing Rating System, Q1 2011 Progress Report: Impact
Investing: Challenges and Opportunities to Scale (2011), available at
https://www.bcorporation.net/sites/all/themes/adaptivetheme/bcorp/pdfs/G
IIRS_2011-Progress-Report.pdf.
124 See Dadush, supra note 101, at 402-11.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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must therefore take on the difficult task of making deep adjustments
to the conventional blueprint to support a healthy market for
impact.
Hybridity is multi-dimensional, pervasive, and intrinsic to social
finance. It is at once the most compelling and the most dangerous
feature of this new industry. Compelling because it embodies the
promise of social finance, to change the way that companies do
business, and make the world a better place. Dangerous because it
is built upon a tense merger between two historically opposed
imperatives that can clash in a way that critically compromises the
anti-poverty and social development missions of impact
investments.127 Profit and social good are not natural bedfellows,
and, at the risk of taking the metaphor too far, simply covering them
with the same sheet does not guarantee that they will not kick each
other in their sleep. As cautioned in a catalytic study on impact
investing by JP Morgan, “it would be naïve to believe that these two
imperatives are never in tension.”128
Some commentators go further and identify a tradeoff between
the two: “Accomplishing either of these objectives makes the other
more difficult to achieve, placing the dual goals in tension.”129 To
illustrate the tradeoff argument, consider the example of
microfinance. Recall that the interest rates charged on MFI loans are
on average very high, with some in excess of 100 percent. As
observed in a CGAP130 Focus Note, “[e]ven people who favor a
commercial approach to most microfinance have to scratch their
heads when they see shareholders making annual returns of 100
percent on their investments, compounded for eight years
running.”131 Head scratching makes sense when one identifies the
source of profits, namely, the poor. Simply put, when interest rates
are higher than needed to cover expenses, MFI shareholders profit.
Arena, supra note 41, at 276.
EMERGING ASSET CLASS, supra note 20, at 67.
129 Arena, supra note 41, at 274.
130 See Richard Rosenberg, CGAP Reflection on the Compartamos Initial Public
Offering: A Case Study on Microfinance Interest Rates and Profit, CGAP (June 2007),
https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Focus-Note-CGAPReflections-on-the-Compartamos-Initial-Public-Offering-A-Case-Study-onMicrofinance-Interest-Rates-and-Profits-Jun-2007.pdf
(explaining
that
the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor is a partnership of organizations that
advances financial inclusion housed at the World Bank).
131 Id. at 4.
127
128
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The ethical rub is that it is the micro-borrowers, or the CustomerBeneficiaries of microfinance, who pay the interest that is then
converted into profit for MFI owners. The conversion of need into
profit can be discomforting, especially if revenues greatly exceed
costs. Yet, it is entirely consistent with the workings of hybridity.
Social finance aims to advance the interests of both businesses
and beneficiaries, but it is not difficult to imagine how the interests
of businesses might be advanced at the expense of beneficiaries:
“higher charges to borrowers correlate directly with higher profits
captured by investors . . . there is a direct and obvious conflict
between the welfare of clients and the welfare of investors.”132
While it may be acceptable to profit from customers in this way in a
conventional commercial context, the acceptability gauge shifts in
light of the promises made by social finance.
3.3. Mission Drift and the Dangers of Commercialization
Social-Financial hybridity is the source of mission drift, when
profit seeking is prioritized over the social mission to the detriment
of the latter. Mission drift can take various forms: “In pursuit of
more profit, a business may be inclined to target relatively better-off
customers, raise prices to take advantage of the lack of competition
often encountered in underserved markets, or take cash out of the
business rather than reinvest in innovation to enable even broader
customer reach.”133 Thus, mission drift can manifest in changes to
the customer base of a social business, so that the customers who
cost more to serve become sidelined, even when they formed the
original target group, and even though they remain grossly underserved by conventional market providers. Alternatively, the
programmatic focus of the business can shift to activities that
generate greater financial revenue, rather than social benefit.134 The

Id. at 10.
EMERGING ASSET CLASS, supra note 20, at 67.
134 See HOMI KHARAS & ANDREW ROGERSON, OVERSEAS DEV. INST., HORIZON
2025: CREATIVE DESTRUCTION IN THE AID INDUSTRY 20 (2012), available at http://www.
odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7723.pdf
(“the requirement to generate returns for private investors will skew investments
towards more obviously cash-generating areas, at the expense of governments’
other developmental objectives.”).
132
133
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costs of this type of mission drift are born primarily by CustomerBeneficiaries.
Mission drift can also result in revenue being deployed to
increase executive compensation or investor dividends, rather than
to expand access to the service or good being provided.135 This type
of mission drift affects both Customer-Beneficiaries and WorkerBeneficiaries, but can be particularly harmful to the latter. WorkerBeneficiaries employed by a social business that is drifting from its
mission could, for example, see a contraction of the skills-building
component of their employment, or be locked into a relatively low
wage—ostensibly to subsidize capacity building programs—even
when resources are available to increase salaries or benefits.
In its most acute form, mission drift can harm the very people
who are supposed to benefit from social finance. This was seen in
the microfinance crisis that seized the Indian state of Andhra
Pradesh in 2010, sending ripples of alarm across the microfinance
industry globally.136 As explained, MFIs embody hybridity through
the simultaneous pursuit of a strong social mission and a strong
financial mission. Seeking to grow operations and reach more
borrowers, some MFIs have embarked on a commercialization
trajectory that fundamentally changes their financing structures.
This means that they have seen their financing evolve from
philanthropic grants to interest-bearing loans to equity
investments.137 For example, SKS, one of the largest MFIs in India,
was originally founded on a mission to eradicate poverty as a nonMorduch, supra note 118.
See CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR, ANDHRA PRADESH 2010: GLOBAL
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS IN INDIAN MICROFINANCE 5 (2010) [hereinafter GLOBAL
IMPLICATIONS], available at https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAPFocus-Note-Andhra-Pradesh-2010-Global-Implications-of-the-Crisis-in-IndianMicrofinance-Nov-2010.pdf; see also Elisabeth Rhyne, Recalibrating Microfinance: A
Six-Point
Program,
CTR.
FOR
GLOBAL
DEV.
(Dec.
21,
2010),
http://www.cgdev.org/blog/
recalibrating-microfinance-six-point-program
(describing the crisis in Andhra Pradesh as “the most serious challenge to the
microfinance sector in its brief history” and explaining that “calls are arising to
‘recalibrate’ microfinance, or . . . to ‘get the house in order.’”).
137 See generally RICHARD ROSENBERG, CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR,
REFLECTIONS ON THE COMPARTAMOS INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING: A CASE STUDY ON
MICROFINANCE INTEREST RATES AND PROFITS (2007), available at http://www.cgap.
org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Focus-Note-CGAP-Reflections-on-theCompartamos-Initial-Public-Offering-A-Case-Study-on-Microfinance-InterestRates-and-Profits-Jun-2007.pdf (suggesting that Compartamos’ expansion was
substantially funded by borrowers).
135
136
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profit organization financed with grant money.138 It later received
loan financing from both public and private lenders, and eventually
re-incorporated as a for-profit, which allowed it to bring in equity
investment.139 In 2010, SKS achieved the final milestone of
commercialization by becoming a publicly listed company: It had a
hugely successful Initial Public Offering (“IPO”) on the Bombay
Stock Exchange in which its shares were over thirteen times
oversubscribed.140
At each step in the commercialization process, the pressure to
prioritize profit over the social mission increases.
This is
particularly true if corporate control shifts to owners who are less
committed to the social mission than the original owner-founders.141
In the case of SKS, commercialization led to a re-prioritizing of the
MFI’s objectives, with growth becoming paramount. In the lead-up
to the IPO, SKS management endeavored to increase profit in order
to drive up the value of its soon-to-be-public shares. Lending was
quickly and significantly expanded, in part by cutting corners on the
due diligence processes for screening borrowers. Loosening the due
diligence standards led to a practice of over-lending to individuals
who could not afford to service their debt. Arena describes this as
the “debt trap” form of mission drift, where “the drive to achieve
large volumes of loans (ensuring high aggregate returns) leads the
MFI to extend loans unethically or irresponsibly to clients who
cannot actually afford them.”142
Added to this, when borrowers (unsurprisingly) defaulted on
loan payments, SKS’s loan officers, whose salaries and commissions
were tied to the volume and performance of their loans,143
138 FAQ’s, SKS MICROFINANCE, http://www.sksindia.com/faq.php
(last
visited Aug. 17, 2014).
139 Vikash Kumar & Daniel Rozas, SKS Microfinance Journey to IPO: An Inside
Story, DANIEL ROZAS, MICRO OPUS (May 12, 2010), http://www.danielrozas.com/
2010/05/12/exclusive-sks-microfinance-journey-to-ipo-an-inside-story/.
140 Id.
141 Cummings, supra note 60, at 589; see also Hybrid Ideal, supra note 7, at 54.
142 Arena, supra note 41, at 276. See also, Chrystin Ondersma, A Human Rights
Approach to Consumer Credit, TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (analyzing how lending
practices that lead to over-indebtedness affect the protection of human rights).
143 GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS, supra note 136, at 5 (describing “cascading
incentives” resulting from over-emphasis on MFI growth from top to middle
management to front line loan officers and driving “behavior that distorts basic
good banking principles” including “unhealthy rises in loan amounts, cutting
corners in the underwriting process, and resulting in an excessive supply of credit.
Incentives at the field level are often based solely on disbursements and collection
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reportedly employed coercive debt collection practices to shame
defaulting borrowers into paying.144 The combination of overlending, inability to repay, and shaming practices—which was not
unique to SKS—has been blamed for a tragic wave of borrower
The chairman of India’s Microfinance
suicides in 2010.145
Institutions Network reacted, saying that “multiple lending, overindebtedness, coercive recovery practices and unseemly enrichment
by promoters and senior executives [of micro-credit companies] has
led to this situation.”146
The events in Andhra Pradesh provide an alarming illustration
of the effects that mission drift and commercialization can have on
social businesses that transact with the poor.147 In an ironic twist, it
is precisely when social businesses become successful enough to
commercialize that mission drift can creep in and create cracks in
the social goods supply chain through which beneficiaries can slip.
Indeed, episodes such as the one in Andhra Pradesh give flesh to the
concern that entities that serve marginalized populations can lose

volumes, with insufficient incentives for sound underwriting and customer care.”).
144 Justin Oliver, Who’s the Culprit? Accessing Finance in Andhra Pradesh,
CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST THE POOR (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.cgap.org/
blog/who%E2%80%99s-culprit-accessing-finance-andhra-pradesh.
145 Id.; see also Erika Kinetz, AP IMPACT: Lender’s Own Probe Links It To Suicides,
YAHOO FINANCE, Feb. 24, 2012, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ap-impactlenders-own-probe-080122405.html (explaining that the implicated MFIs denied
any responsibility for the suicides before the Indian Supreme Court, refuting
allegations that employees “verbally harassed over-indebted borrowers, forced
them to pawn valuable items, incited other borrowers to humiliate them and
orchestrated sit-ins outside their homes to publicly shame them . . . . Only in death
would the debts be forgiven.”); Elizabeth Rhyne, On Microfinance: Who’s to Blame for
the Crisis in Andhra Pradesh?, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov.
2, 2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elisabeth-rhyne/on-microfinance-whos-tob_b_777911.html; Neha Thirani, ‘Yunus Was Right,’ SKS Microfinance Founder Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2012, http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/27/yunuswas-right-sks-microfinance-founder-says/?_r=1; Associated Press, Hundreds of
Suicides in India Linked to Microfinance Organizations, BUSINESS INSIDER, Feb. 24, 2012,
http://www.businessinsider.
com/hundreds-of-suicides-in-india-linked-tomicrofinance-organizations-2012-2; Soutik Biswas, India’s Micro-Finance Suicide
Epidemic, BBC NEWS, Dec. 16, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-southasia-11997571 [hereinafter Suicide Epidemic].
146 Suicide Epidemic, supra note 145.
147 Arena, supra note 41, at 273 (observing that in the face of commercial
pressure, MFIs are forced to “pick a side: either abandon their social orientation and
formalize into a regular financial institution or forgo financial self-sustainability
and remain a subsidy-dependent NGO.”).
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sight of their social mission when competing commercial interests
come into play.148
In early 2011, Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus, the
celebrated microfinance pioneer, wrote an op-ed for the New York
Times:
I never imagined that one day microcredit would give rise to
its own breed of loan sharks. But it has. And as a result,
many borrowers in India have been defaulting on their
microloans, which could then result in lenders being driven
out of business. India’s crisis points to a clear need to get
microcredit back on track.149
Yunus blames the turn of microfinance away from the interests
of the poor on commercialization: “Commercialization has been a
terrible wrong turn for microfinance, and it indicates a worrying
‘mission drift’ in the motivation of those lending to the poor.
Poverty should be eradicated, not seen as a money-making
opportunity.”150
Yunus opposed the SKS IPO, voicing the concern that for-profit
MFIs would inevitably engage in predatory lending practices, “one
of the very things which microfinance ought to protect the poor
against.”151 This critique hits at the heart of the concern with
adopting market-based solutions to solve social problems. Indeed,
SKS’s drastic departure from its social mission led “many observers
to question whether social problems . . . can be solved through
strategies that also produce revenue.”152 Yunus’s view is that “[y]ou
will never see the situation of poor people if you look at it through
the glasses of profit-making.”153
As explained above, the
ramifications of mission drift are amplified when individuals living
at the BoP are affected, precisely because their financial cushion is

Id.
Muhammad Yunus, Sacrificing Microcredit for Megaprofits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/opinion/15yunus.html?ref=
microfinance.
150 Jesse R. Gero, Financing Social Enterprise, Realizing Political Equality: How
the Consumer-Beneficiary Model of Social Enterprise Secures Beneficiary Participation and
Why We Should Care, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 617, 623 (2013).
151 Id. at 662.
152 Hybrid Ideal, supra note 7, at 52.
153 Big Profits, supra note 48.
148
149
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so thin: “the consequences of a business exploiting its customers can
be particularly devastating, given how little they have.”154
Given that microfinance is among the more established strands
of social finance, it is not surprising that it is also among the first to
materialize this particular type of market failure. As Jonathan
Morduch warns, we must learn from India’s microfinance
experience and mitigate the risks of social harm that come with
commercialization:
The investors surely had good intentions and social
commitments, but balance was lost. There’s often good
reason to think that impact investments can bring a world of
good, but it’s dangerous to ignore the flip side of the coin.
There are times when investors can help turn something
good into something risky for customers, as in India.155
To summarize, mission drift is a product of the tensions
involved with hybridity, tensions that are aggravated by
commercialization. When mission drift occurs, the social gets
squeezed out of social finance. Clearly, therefore, hybridity must be
regulated. This is a complex project for both public and private
regulators to undertake, but a necessary one given the vulnerability
of social finance beneficiaries.156 Hybridity constitutes a pressing
regulatory challenge. It is morally pressing because it creates
opportunities for exploitation and abuse under the guise of
promoting market-based solutions to improve lives. It is also
pressing time-wise because social finance is still in the market
building stage. This means that whatever definitions, standards,
rules, and enforcement mechanisms are developed today will
fundamentally shape this fast-growing space for years to come.
Such norms can quickly become entrenched and difficult to change.
SSEs are well positioned to play a significant role in this normsetting process. The next Parts consider how effective SSEs, as
currently designed, are likely to be in performing this important
regulatory function.

EMERGING ASSET CLASS, supra note 20, at 68.
Morduch, supra note 118, at 5.
156 See Kevin E. Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer to Peer Financing for Development:
Regulating the Intermediaries, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1209, 1227 (2010)
[hereinafter Davis & Gelpern] (identifying hybridity as a regulatory challenge).
154
155
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4. SSES AS REGULATORS 157
Today, social finance, and more specifically, the investors and
businesses operating within this space, are generally underregulated. In practical terms, this means that we lack regulatory
tools for effectively differentiating social impact investors or social
businesses from their respective conventional counterparts in a
systematic or consistent way. Yet, unless these differences are
drawn in a meaningful and workable fashion, there is little reason
to expect that social finance will amount to much beyond an esthetic
enhancement of the existing business and finance landscapes. In the
worst case, social finance could actually make a negative
contribution to social welfare. Significant rulemaking needs to take
place for this regulatory vacuum to be filled.
As platforms for connecting impact investors, social businesses,
and, less directly, beneficiaries, SSEs are well positioned to take on
at least some of this work. Though still in their infancy, SSEs are
useful to study for three main reasons: First, a central function of
SSEs is to help social businesses commercialize their financing so
that they can scale up operations and break their dependency on
grant funding. As explained in the last Part, this launches SSEs into
troubled waters, where the risk of mission drift is most acute.
Tracking the development of SSE “law” with respect to mission drift
can help to identify mechanisms for regulating hybridity and
commercializing social solutions in a way that is safe and
sustainable.
Second, SSEs ostensibly do the actual work of differentiating
social from conventional finance by creating a separate marketplace
for impact investments. SSEs can achieve this by developing specific
listing criteria for social businesses wishing to transact on their
platform; establishing requirements with which listed businesses
must comply in order to stay listed, such as the production of
financial and social reports; formulating and implementing rules
and standards to govern social finance transactions, such as
requiring a minimum investment duration, for example; putting in
place investor-screens to ensure that the “right” kinds of investors
access the platform; and, last but not least, setting up the
157 This title is inspired by Paul Mahoney’s piece, The Exchange As Regulator, 83
VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997).
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mechanisms for enforcing all of these rules, such as clear de-listing
conditions and accessible grievance mechanisms. All of this
rulemaking work can make a huge contribution to the crucial
regulatory project of concretely differentiating the social finance
space from its conventional counterpart.
Even if SSEs never become major players in international capital
markets or never manage to transform impact investing into a
mainstream type of investment, the rules and norms that they
release into the world matter for understanding how to go about
regulating social finance. Furthermore, by providing a venue for
social businesses and investors to “meet,” SSEs not only create but
also structure the relationships between these stakeholders, and, less
directly but no less importantly, the beneficiaries. From a regulatory
perspective, this means that SSEs could create important lines of
accountability between the key social finance stakeholders—another
big contribution to the regulatory project.
Third, SSEs are self-regulated to the extent that the rules they
create and implement among their members—listed businesses and
investors—are not being “fed” to them by an official government
regulator. This is particularly true of the SSE-developed rules
pertaining to social impact securities, since regulations already exist
for conventional securities. We can therefore expect that SSE
accountability will largely come from the social finance market
itself, meaning the existing and potential users of the platforms.
Because their survival depends on market appeal, SSEs can help us
to better grasp the opportunities and limitations of self-regulation.
More specifically, the study of SSEs allows us to see what can be
done with the opportunity to design and curate rules for
administering a new market, and how that opportunity might be
constrained by that very market and the interests operating within
it. This process should be of particular interest to lawyers who want
to understand how rules can make (or not) a positive difference in
the world.
4.1. Transnational Rulemaking Laboratories
Just as CSEs did for conventional finance, SSEs are well
positioned to adopt and develop rules and standards for regulating
social finance. Historically, securities regulation was an entirely
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private affair managed by self-regulated stock exchanges. Stock
exchanges were themselves conceived as private bodies or clubs.158
For example, the London Stock Exchange traces its roots back to the
bowels of a coffee shop called Jonathan’s Coffee House in the 18th
century.159 Jonathan’s was transformed into a private trading club
that regulated membership, access to the physical premises, and the
transactions in which members engaged.160 Today, the securities
field retains a strong self-regulating dimension, even though
government is much more involved.161
In the U.S., for example, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), the agency charged with enforcing federal
securities law, delegates many regulatory responsibilities to selfregulating organizations (“SROs”). SROs are private institutions
that establish, monitor compliance with, and enforce rules
applicable to securities markets and the conduct of market
participants.162 They include exchanges like the New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”) and NASDAQ. The Securities Act of 1934
requires that the SEC recognizes SROs and that SROs “regulate their
members with both their own rules and federal securities laws.”163
In the U.S., as in many other jurisdictions, CSEs are responsible for
developing and ensuring compliance with exchange-specific rules,
as well as with public legislation.164 Thus, exchanges have
significant rulemaking power and discretion, particularly for new or
specialized markets.

Id., at 1483.
Id.
160 Id.
161 See Edward Peter Stringham & Ivan Chen, The Alternative of Private
Regulation: The London Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market As A Model 39
(George Mason Univ., Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 12-30, 2012) (explaining
that private exchanges were the sole rule-makers for securities regulation and that
they were privately regulated in the U.K. until 1986); see also John Carson, SelfRegulation in Securities Markets (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper
No.
5542,
2011),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/
WPS5542_Self_Regulation_in_Securities_Markets.pdf [hereinafter Carson]; Adam
C. Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Securities Markets 32-39 (Univ. of Mich. Ctr. For
Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 02-008, 2003), http://www.law.umich.edu/
centersandprograms/olin/papers.htm [hereinafter Pritchard].
162 Carson, supra note 161, at 5.
163 Id. at 6.
164 Id.
158
159
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This background explains why SSEs can expect to enjoy
independence as rule-makers for social finance, in particular when
it comes to developing rules to regulate social-financial hybridity.
Today, securities regulation is not granular enough to properly
address the distinctive hybridity-related requirements of social
finance. SSEs can therefore be described as operating like
“rulemaking laboratories” that develop and test regulations for an
under-governed space. They are poised to follow in CSEs’
regulatory footsteps and do the regulatory legwork of formulating,
mainstreaming, and implementing rules and standards for social
finance. Though SSE law will initially be limited in application to
SSE members and invite only voluntary compliance, this could
change as it did when CSE-developed rules became formalized as
official, publicly enforceable, securities regulation.
SSEs can be described as “transnational” rulemaking
laboratories because they develop norms that exceed the legal
jurisdictions for which they were developed.165 For example, the
SVX model is currently being replicated outside of Canada, in the
U.S. and in Mexico.166 SSEs also keep track of each other’s progress
and experience.167
Thus, the lessons learned and practices
developed by the U.K.’s SSX could influence those adopted by the
Singapore-Mauritius IX, for example. Furthermore, as suggested
just above, the dissemination of SSE law isn’t limited to SSEs or even
to private actors. Indeed, the standards adopted by SVX, which is
based in Canada’s Ontario Province, could influence government
regulators at the provincial and the national level. In fact, SVX is
165 See Greg Shaffer, Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE, (Ed. Gregory Shaffer, 2013)
(explaining that “the concept of transnational law has been developed to address
legal norms that do not clearly fall within traditional conceptions of national and
international law but are not necessarily global in nature,” and highlighting the
limitations of state-centric theories of public and private international law as
compared with the concept of “transnational legal orders” for capturing the
processes underlying the “construction, flow, and impact of transnational legal
norms”); see also Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Kirsch and Richard Stewart, The
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005)
(developing a framework for understanding the formation and administration of
transnational orders that shape and are shaped by the conduct of state and nonstate actors).
166 Adam Spence, SVX Scaling Social Innovation Across Borders, (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://socialfinance.ca/2014/11/18/svx-scaling-social-innovation-acrossborders/.
167 Interview with Adam Spence, SVX Founder, (July 24, 2015).
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working to carve out an exception under Ontario securities law to
allow non-accredited investors to transact on its platform.168
SSE rulemaking could also inform the content of public law in
other countries where regulators have been tasked with upgrading
social enterprise or social disclosure laws, for example. It is not
difficult to imagine a “transplant”169 of the SSE legal ordering
framework to a developing country whose social businesses are
listed on the Singapore-Mauritius IX in East Asia and Africa, for
example, as these countries may lack resources to develop new law.
Indeed, an important distinction between private regulation and
official regulation is that the former are not limited to a particular
legal jurisdiction. This can be advantageous, especially when it
comes to shaping and governing new markets.
While SSEs may have discretion to develop rules pertaining to
the social dimension of social finance, they and the businesses they
list must nevertheless comply with applicable securities regulation
and corporate law. In other words, even though SSEs are private
platforms with significant rulemaking powers, they are not
themselves completely unregulated. SSE platforms must comply
with applicable securities laws, in other words. Coming back to the
SVX example, to date, non-accredited investors as defined under
Ontario securities law are not allowed to transact on that platform;
this restriction is imposed by law, not SVX. Similarly, in order to
list, companies must show that they are in compliance with
applicable securities laws and that they are in good corporate
standing.
SSEs can be described as transnational rulemaking laboratories
because the law they produce can travel within the social finance
market and across borders to reach both public and private rulemakers.
And, as in the earlier discussion concerning the
formalization of new corporate forms and private certification
schemes, it is important not to confuse the private and voluntary
features of self-regulation and the absence of legal enforcement with
Spence, supra note 166.
See generally KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 1960-1995, 47 (1999);
Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, The
Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA.J. INT’L ECON.L. 791,
794-95 (2002); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, Chapter 25: Modelling,
Globalization and the Politics of Empowerment, in GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION, 578602 (2000).
168
169
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lack of regulatory power. The history of securities regulation
demonstrates that government takes many of its regulatory cues
from private rule-makers, particularly when dealing with new
markets.170 It also demonstrates that private actors have strong
incentives to comply with rules that enable them to do business
more efficiently, even when those rules are not officially enforceable.
In other words, when the benefits of voluntary compliance exceed
the costs—which can include market exclusion—private ordering
regimes can be just as effective as official regulation.171
4.2. Regulating Through Stock Exchanges: Why the Why Matters
CSEs rely on three main devices to administer financial
regulation: listing requirements, corporate governance and
disclosure requirements, and enforcement or de-listing
mechanisms.172 All of these devices apply to CSE issuers and are
designed to protect the interests of investors by correcting
information asymmetries in order to prevent fraud, better inform
investor decision-making, and promote competition.173 They are
each replicated by SSEs, as described below. A central argument
here is that, while some replication is necessary and desirable, SSEs
must carefully tailor the devices they employ to effectively regulate
against mission drift and protect beneficiary interests. If they are to
meet the hybridity challenge, in other words, SSEs will need to
adjust and devise new mechanisms that are especially designed to
mitigate the risks of mission drift and to take into account the needs

170 See generally WALTER MATLLI & TIM BUTHE, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE
PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011) (providing a detailed
account of the adoption of private rules for financial reporting by public bodies);
see also Claire Kelley & Roberta Karmell, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 884-85 (2009) (explaining how U.S. securities
laws are shaped by private standards and rules).
171 See Carson, supra note 161, at 9 (explaining that while exchange membership
may be voluntary, as a practical matter, it is “essential to carry on securities
business”); see also Davis & Gelpern, supra note 156, at 1255-57 and 1265-66
(describing the virtues and limitations of private ordering).
172 Hans Christiansen & Alissa Kolderstova, The Role of Stock Exchanges in
Corporate Governance, OECD JOURNAL: FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS, 4 (2008).
173 See generally Stephen Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing
Strong Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1694-95 (2001-2002).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/4

2015]

REGULATING SOCIAL FINANCE

191

and vulnerabilities of Customer-Beneficiaries and WorkerBeneficiaries.
This means that it will not be sufficient for SSEs simply to
“blueprint” the CSE regulatory model.174 Instead, to create a truly
social stock exchange, SSEs must take every opportunity to adjust
the CSE blueprint and to inject it with beneficiary protections. It is
on this basis that SSE success should be evaluated. Drawing new
investors and capital into the social problem-solving space is of
course an important mark of SSE success, as well. However, unless
beneficiary interests feature centrally in the legal order that SSEs
establish, these new regulators will have only partially succeeded in
truly differentiating social from conventional finance.
Securities regulation in conventional markets is intended to
protect the interests of investors above all and this requires trust. As
Pritchard observes,
[s]ecurities markets cannot operate without trust. Investors
can trust in exchanges to regulate because of their powerful
incentive to maximize trading volume. The many choices
that investors have today remind exchanges that investor
protection is a crucial part of their business. Investors will
leave markets that fail to protect investors to find markets
that will.175
The beneficiaries of CSE regulation and conventional securities
regulation are the investors. While a well-functioning market is
considered a “public good,” the actual public, meaning the
investment-affected
communities,
are
distant
secondary
beneficiaries of securities regulation as compared with investors.176
174 The International Securities Commissions Organization (IOSCO) explains
that “[t]he broad objectives of self-regulation are the same as those identified for
government regulation of financial markets . . . to preserve market integrity . . . to
preserve financial integrity . . . and to protect investors.” IOSCO SRO CONSULTATIVE
COMMITTEE, MODEL FOR EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION, at 2 (2000), available at http://
www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD110.pdf. Accordingly, the SEC’s
stated mission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets,
and facilitate capital formation.” The Investors Advocate: How the SEC Protects
Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
(June
10,
2013),
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo. shtml#.VNPxVFXF9so.
175 Pritchard, supra note 161, at 39.
176 IOSCO Technical Committee, Issues Paper on Exchange Demutualization,
at 4, 10 (2000), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD119.pdf; see also IOSCO TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, CONSULTATION REPORT:
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In the conventional context, investors are the consumers, not the
subjects of regulation, which explains why very few rules govern
investor conduct. The “why” of SSEs—to create platforms for
improving lives and the health of the planet—is fundamentally
different from the why of CSEs, and that difference should feature
centrally in SSE design. An important measure of SSE regulatory
success will therefore be how well their rules protect that social
difference, or how well they protect the interests of beneficiaries,
alongside those of investors.
5. THREE NEW KIDS ON THE REGULATORY BLOCK:
SSX, SVX, AND IX
The three SSEs discussed in this sub-section are still very new,
having emerged only in 2013. This review is therefore necessarily
preliminary, as these platforms are likely to evolve substantially in
the next few years. Some key features can nevertheless be identified
and initial assessments are made concerning the likelihood of
regulatory success. For each SSE, we report on the purpose or
mission of the platform, its regulatory status, the devices employed
to regulate social business issuers (listing requirements, reporting
and corporate governance requirements, and enforcement
mechanisms), and any devices employed to regulate investors.
At the outset, it bears noting that none of these platforms is yet
trading in impact securities per se. Though it calls itself an SSE, the
U.K.’s SSX is an information portal that provides investors with
details about the social impact of businesses that are listed on
conventional exchanges. SVX in Canada is a private placement
platform that connects investors with social businesses and enables
them to transact, but as yet there is no secondary market for trading
in the resulting impact securities. Finally, the Impact Exchange (IX)
of Mauritius (designed in Singapore) is most similar to a CSE in that
it will eventually be possible for social businesses to sell shares on
REGULATORY ISSUES ARISING FROM EXCHANGE EVOLUTION, at 6 (2006), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD212.pdf (“The fair and
efficient functioning of an exchange is of significant benefit to the public. The
efficiency of the secondary market . . . facilitates efficient raising of capital for
commercial enterprises, benefiting both the wider corporate sector and the
economy as a whole.”).
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the exchange, and for those shares to be traded on the secondary
market, but this has yet to happen.

5.1. The Social Stock Exchange (SSX), United Kingdom

5.1.1. The mission
On June 6, 2013, U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron announced
the launch of the SSX during the Social Impact Investment Forum,
which was held just prior to the G8 summit:
We need a robust way of . . . connecting businesses that
deliver social and environmental value with investors
seeking both a social and a financial return. So I am
absolutely delighted that today the London Stock Exchange
is supporting the launch of the world’s first Social Stock
Exchange, an online portal that will become the first
information platform on the planet to showcase publicly
listed social impact businesses.177
SSX seeks to increase the visibility of social businesses among
the investment community and “to create an efficient, universally
accessible buyers’ and sellers’ marketplace where impact investors
and social impact businesses of all sizes can achieve greater impact
either through capital allocation or capital raising.” 178 It further
intends to “bridge the gap between the increasing desire of
businesses to make a difference alongside making a profit, and those
investors who share this vision and have the means to enable it to
be fulfilled.”179 SSX’s mission reveals a clear emphasis on capital
raising and drawing investors into the social finance space.
177 Cameron Speech supra note 1; see also FAQs, SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE,
http://www.socialstockexchange.com/faqs (last visited Mar. 2, 2015); Troilo, supra
note 36.
178 Our Mission, SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE, http://socialstockexchange.com/
our-mission-history/.
179 Id.
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When it comes to marketing itself to potential members, SSX
mentions the following advantages:
Your company will be identified as a leading organisation
delivering social or environmental impact through core
business activities. Your company will be able to capitalise
on the growing momentum around social impact
investment. The core social and environmental aims of your
business will become more transparent and visible, and
ultimately more quantifiable and rewarded. You will benefit
from a wide range of targeted marketing and
communication programmes aimed at impact investors.180
To fulfill its mission, SSX must address some of the problems
that impair the growth of social finance, in particular the “lack of
consistent data and regulation, the need for mission-oriented
businesses to gain greater visibility, and a scarcity of mature
enterprises to absorb available capital from interested impact
investors, all of which lead to low investor confidence.”181 SSX can
therefore be described as performing a two-pronged regulatory
function: To create a rules-based, informationally rich and
transparent platform that can draw investors into the social finance
space and stimulate social business activity, and, as a necessary
corollary, build up investor trust.
5.1.2. Trading and official oversight
SSX is not an actual trading platform. It is more accurately
described as an information portal that investors can access to learn
about impact investing opportunities: It “does not facilitate share
trading but serves as a directory and research service for would-be
social impact investors.”182 The companies listed on SSX must
180 Become a Member, SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE, http://socialstockexchange.
com/become-a-member/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
181 Evan Weaver, Marrying cash and change: Social ‘stock markets’ spread
worldwide,
THE
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Aug.
30,
2012),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Making-a-difference/Change-Agent/2012/
0830/Marrying-cash-and-change-Social-stock-markets-spread-worldwide
[hereinafter Weaver].
182 Vanessa Kortekaas & Ruth Sullivan U.K.’s, Social Stock Exchange Set to
Include International Members, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Kortekaas &
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already be publicly traded companies on a CSE and therefore trade
in whatever securities are permitted under their CSE’s rules. The
SSX is therefore “not for start-ups – it’s for more mature companies
that need to raise significant amounts of money for growth and
expansion.”183
Currently, the SSX lists 14 social impact businesses working in
diverse areas: One company manufactures and licenses
environmentally sustainable building materials; another is a
developer of affordable housing that supports community health
and social care services in the U.K.; another specializes in healthcare
property and ensuring compliance with the recently enacted Health
and Social Care Act; yet another, headquartered in the U.S.
specializes in water purification technologies that are sold through
partner distribution companies in the Asia Pacific region, Central
and South America, and in the U.S. About 14 more companies are
currently under review for admission by the members of the SSX
Admissions Panel.
The SSX is open to companies headquartered outside the U.K.,
meaning that issuers can be incorporated in any jurisdiction, so long
as they qualify to list on the SSE. As concerns official oversight,
while SSX is supported by the London Stock Exchange, it is no part
of the exchange. The SSX is a standalone non-profit entity that is not
regulated by an official body. However, since businesses that list on
the SSX must also be listed on a CSE, they will be subject to the rules
of that CSE, including the CSE’s home-state legislation. As
discussed above, CSE rules pertain to conventional securities
regulation, which is focused on financial performance. As concerns
social performance, SSX has broad rulemaking powers, and
businesses must comply with SSX rules if they wish to list and stay
listed.
5.1.3. Regulating social businesses
5.1.3.1. Listing and governance requirements

Sullivan].
183 Weaver, supra note 181; see generally Future Plans, SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE,
http://socialstockexchange.com/future-plans/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
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As mentioned above, in order to be listed on the SSX, companies
must already be listed on an SSX-approved CSE.184 Thus, only forprofit companies can list on the SSX. This is the first eligibility
criterion. The second is that the company must have “social or
environmental impact as a core aim” (emphasis added—the mission
does not have to be the core aim).185 To satisfy this requirement,
companies must submit a Social Impact Report for review by the
independent Admissions Panel composed of 11 finance and impactinvesting experts. The Report must be drafted with the assistance of
an approved, independent impact analyst.186 If the application is
accepted, the company must pay an annual listing fee of £10, 000,
unless waived.187
As concerns corporate governance, applicants must commit to
“transparency and disclosure around such issues as remuneration,
tax and ownership, as well as key activities such as arms sales,
pornography, bonded labour, child labour, tobacco, abuse of human
rights or discriminatory employment practices.”188 Applicants must
also disclose “any other reputational reason why your company
should be admitted to the SSX.189 Presumably this includes
disclosure of pending or prospective lawsuits. While the SSX
application requires applicants to affirm that they adhere to the UK
Corporate Governance Guidelines, the latter contain no specific
requirements concerning social corporate governance. The focus is
almost entirely financial. For example, the Guidelines recommend
only that “[t]he board and its committees should have the
appropriate balance of skills, experience, independence and
knowledge of the company to enable them to discharge their
respective duties and responsibilities effectively.”190 These are
184 SSX APPLICATION FORM, http://socialstockexchange.com/membership/
business-register-part-3/ [hereinafter SSX APPLICATION FORM].
185 Become a Member, SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE, http://socialstockexchange.
com/become-member (last visited Mar. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Become a Member].
186 Id.
187 Kortekaas & Sullivan, supra note 182; see also SSX APPLICATION FORM, supra
note 184.
188 SSX APPLICATION FORM, supra note 184.
189 Id.
190 Financial Reporting Council, The U.K. Corporate Governance Code, The Main
Principles of the Code: Effectiveness, 5 (Sept. 2014), available at https://www.frc.
org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-CorporateGovernance-Code-2014.pdf.
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vague terms of reference for the board members of a business with
a social mission.
Further, SSX does not provide additional specificity when it
comes to defining directors' duties and responsibilities or skills.
This means that the leadership of an SSX-listed business could lack
the skills to advance or ensure compliance with the firm’s social
mission. In other words, aside from having a social (or an
environmental) mission as a core aim, and “committing to”
disclosing anti-social activities, the SSX governance requirements
are not specific about how listed entities should fulfill their social
promises. As an independent rule-maker, SSX could do more to
elucidate what good social corporate governance looks like. For
example, it could have required that applicants task a board member
with monitoring compliance with the social mission and with
identifying mechanisms to engage with beneficiaries.
5.1.3.2. Disclosure and reporting requirements
To stay listed, SSX issuers must provide annual social impact
reports that are made available on the website free of charge.191
While the Admissions Panel is the body responsible for reviewing
the initial report submitted with the application package, it is not
clear if it is also responsible for reviewing the updated annual
reports. It is also not clear whether review and/or verification of the
updated reports are required for continued listing.
Unlike the financial disclosure rules implemented by CSEs, the
SSX reporting rules do not require compliance with a particular set
of standards or format, nor are listed entities required to report on a
particular set of metrics. Rather than relying on metrics to capture
impact, SSX reports mostly contain prose descriptions of social
performance. As a result, SSX impact reports look different from
business to business (e.g. they range from 9 to 28 pages). Some
guidance is provided as to the required content of annual reports,
but mostly in broad strokes. SSX reports must cover five themes: (1)
The social or environmental purpose of the company and the impact
it will deliver; (2) who benefits as a result of the company’s social
impact; (3) how a company’s products, services, and operations
191 Impact Report, SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.socialstockexchange.
com/membership/impact-report (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
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deliver impact; (4) how a company involves and consults with all of
its stakeholders; (5) what evidence a company has of its social
impact and how that evidence is collected, measured, and
reported.192
The lack of metrics and comparable data points for evaluating
social performance could prove problematic for investors if it
increases the cost of investigating investment opportunities.
Otherwise put, SSX vets social businesses and centralizes impact
information, which should reduce investor transaction costs, but
costs could climb because the information collected is not easily
comparable. On the other hand, reporting on impact using prose
rather than quantitative measures may be more protective of
beneficiary interests.
As explained earlier, the emphasis on metrification is
problematic in the social finance context because social returns are
not as easy to quantify or track as financial returns. Investments that
chase reportedly high SROI may not improve social welfare to the
degree hoped for because of the difficulties involved with
measuring actual impact, especially with proxies. Thus, from a
beneficiary perspective, impact prose may be more protective than
numeric reporting. In this regard, themes (2) and (4) are particularly
important since they bring beneficiaries into the reporting fold and
potentially create avenues for holding businesses accountable for
their social promise. However, by providing only general guidance
on reporting, SSX under-utilizes this source of regulatory power.
5.1.4. Enforcement mechanisms
It appears that there are two circumstances under which a
company’s membership to SSX could be suspended: If it fails to
submit an updated annual report and if its business model changes:
As a member of the Social Stock Exchange, you will be
required to update your Impact Report annually. If your
business model changes, such that you are no longer
operating as a social impact business, your Social Stock

192

Id.
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Exchange membership will be suspended pending any
appeal you may wish to make.193
Very little detail is provided as to what constitutes a suspensionworthy change to the business’s model. Further, unless a listed
entity declares to SSX that it has changed, the only way a departure
from the mission could be detected is through a review of the
updated annual impact report, which is concerning, since the
thoroughness of the annual review process is not clear, as mentioned
above.
Other than a suspension based on a change to the business
model and failure to report, the SSX does not appear to have
mechanisms in place for ensuring compliance with its own rules.
For example, neither investors nor beneficiaries can register
complaints (or compliments) about a social business with the SSX.
The combination of vague suspension criteria with limited recourse
for holding businesses accountable, suggests that the enforcement
mechanisms of the SSX are relatively weak. Here again, SSX seems
to under-utilize its regulatory power. This may be because
investment transactions take place on CSEs and not on SSX, but
since CSEs do not deal with the social dimension of business
conduct to the degree necessary to regulate against mission drift,
SVX should use its powers in a more targeted fashion. It could, for
example, develop a framework for identifying conduct that
constitutes a “social breach” by listed entities and design
enforcement devices accordingly.
5.1.5. Regulating investors
The SSX does not differentiate between finance-first and impactfirst investors, meaning that all types of investors can access the
platform. In other words, there is no stated preference for “patient”
investors and no rules in place for regulating investor conduct. The
communication addressed to investors is intended to give them a lay
of the impact investing land in a way that makes this new market
seem familiar and investable, and to build investor trust in the
platform. This may be because the SSX is an information portal, and
actual transactions take place on whatever CSE the business is listed
193

Become a Member, supra note 185.
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on, so that there is little SSX could do to regulate investors’ conduct,
even if it wanted to. But since CSEs do not regulate the social
dimension of investor conduct, SSX would not be stepping on CSEs’
regulatory toes by developing guidelines for investor conduct.
5.1.6. Preliminary assessment
Because SSX operates as an informational rather than a
transactional platform, and because all SSX listed entities are
publicly traded on CSEs, this exchange is well positioned to support
the project of mainstreaming social finance. SSX can draw investors
into the social finance space by presenting them with opportunities
that are attractive because, at least in principle, impact investments
comprise an asset class which require neither big financial nor big
social “sacrifices.”
However, SSX does not appear to make the most of its regulatory
power when it comes to defining the content of social corporate
governance as opposed to conventional corporate governance.
Indeed, SSX requires only that listed entities comply with the
standards set for conventional businesses by CSEs (and the U.K.
Corporate Governance Code). This is problematic not only because
it represents a missed opportunity to differentiate the social from the
conventional space, but also because it could place or keep underequipped directors at the helm of businesses that promise to
produce positive social impact. Other than the impact reports, for
which the standard of review is somewhat unclear, there seems to
be only limited regulation of SSX listed entities. This finding is
reinforced by the fact that the conditions for de-listing a company
are defined only in vague terms.
There may also be issues related to transaction costs resulting
from a dearth of comparable data points for evaluating investment
opportunities. This matters for investors, but also for listed
businesses, because the latter receive little guidance on how to
report on their social performance beyond broad themes, which
means that they may lack tools to assess or increase their
comparative advantage. At the same time, the prose focus in the
reports could, if properly developed and guided, more accurately
capture beneficiary experiences, which in turn could paint a more
complete picture of the impact actually created. Finally, this SSE
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offers little by way of models for regulating investor conduct to be
more patient rather than conventionally short-termist. Overall, and
again this is only a preliminary assessment, SSX has a relatively
weak framework for committing issuers and investors to the social
missions or for holding them to account should they depart from it.
5.2. The Social Venture Connection (SVX), Canada

5.2.1. The mission
SVX was launched in September 2013 with support from, among
others, TMX group (the operator of the Ontario Stock Exchange), the
Government of Ontario, the law firm, Torys LLP, KPMG, the Royal
Bank of Canada, and three charitable foundations, including the
Rockefeller Foundation.194 Its mission is to create a “market for
good” in the form of “a local, impact-first platform connecting
impact ventures, funds, and investors in order to catalyze new debt
and equity investment capital for local ventures that have
demonstrable social and/or environmental impact.” 195 By creating
a venue for investors and businesses to meet, SVX seeks to “mobilize
money toward impact ventures that are reducing poverty, creating
opportunities and advancing environmental sustainability.”196
SVX was developed by the MaRS Center for Impact Investing,
which was formed in Toronto in late 2011 to “mobilize private
capital for public good.”197 As MaRS’s leading initiative, SVX creates
a “space that allows investors to place their capital in enterprises
that can make money and do good, and that allows high-impact
organizations to find the capital they need to help them grow.”198
The long-term aim of SVX is to standardize the local social finance
About, SVX, https://svx.ca/en/about (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
ADAM SPENCE & TRISTINA SINOPOLI, SVX: Invest for impact: Case Study, 3 (Sept.
2013), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/svx.production/cms/files/files/
000/000/007/MaRS_SVX_Case_Study-original.pdf [hereinafter SVX CASE STUDY].
196 Id. at 5.
197 About
the
Centre,
MARS
CENTRE
FOR
IMPACT
INVESTING,
http://impactinvesting.marsdd.com/the-centre/about-the-centre/ (last visited
Mar. 2, 2015).
198 SVX CASE STUDY, supra note 195, at 5.
194
195
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space by creating “a fully regulated market with access for retail
investors that could parallel or be integrated into mainstream
markets.”199
5.2.2. Trading and official regulation
Like the London SSX, SVX is not a true stock exchange. It is “a
private investment platform built to connect impact ventures, funds
and investors.”200 This means that, although SVX aims one day to
be an exchange that is open to the public, as of now, only accredited
investors (who meet certain net worth or income benchmarks) can
transact on the platform. In other words, the securities issued on
SVX are not public and there is no secondary market for them. So
far, SVX has 34 Ontario-based listed issuers and its founders are
exploring possibilities for bringing on additional issuers from other
parts of Canada.201 As mentioned earlier, SVX is also in the process
of replicating its model in the U.S. (in California) and in Mexico.202
SVX is the first online portal registered with a securities regulator in
Canada and the first impact-investing portal registered in North
America.203 It is registered as a restricted dealer with the Ontario
Securities Commission (OSC) and “adheres to all relevant and
applicable securities legislation as prescribed by the OSC,”204
although the FAQs section of the website clarifies that “[n]o
regulatory authority has approved or expressed an opinion about
the securities offered on the SVX.”205
Listed entities include a solar energy cooperative, a company
that manufactures footwear in Ethiopia for sale worldwide, another
that sells refurbished telecommunications equipment, a game
Id. at 3.
SVX
Invest
for
impact,
Issuer
Manual
2,
available
at
http://s3.amazonaws.com/svx.staging/comfy/cms/files/files/000/000/173/SV
X_Issuer_
Manual-original.pdf [hereinafter SVX ISSUER MANUAL].
201 Adam Spence, SVX: From Launch to Getting Deals Done, SOCIAL FINANCE
(Mar. 18, 2014), http://socialfinance.ca/2014/03/18/svx-from-launch-gettingdeals-done/.
202 SVX CASE STUDY, supra note 195, at 10.
203 Id. at 6.
204 FAQ, SVX, https://svx.ca/en/faqs (last visited Mar. 2, 2015) [hereinafter
FAQ].
205 Id. at SVX, Question 8.
199
200
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developer whose games promote a progressive environmental
agenda, a seller of equipment for organic farming operations, a
green housing developer, and a fair trade jewelry business. As with
SSX, businesses are assessed an annual fee to list based on their
revenues: The fee ranges from $500 for revenues under $1 million
to $2,500 for revenues above $10 million.206 SVX fees are lower than
London’s but the entities it targets are smaller.
5.2.3. Regulating social businesses

5.2.3.1. Listing and governance requirements
To list on SVX, entities must meet the Platform Access
Requirements.207 SVX lists small and medium sized local for-profit
social businesses with more than $50,000 but less than $25 million in
revenues.208 It targets for profit businesses, non-profits, and
cooperatives looking to raise anywhere from $100,000 to $10 million
in investments.209 The ventures must have been incorporated in
Ontario for at least two years and have audited financial statements
available.210 Issuers fall into one of two categories: Social impact
issuers defined as “ventures that are creating opportunities and
breaking the cycle of poverty in subsectors including affordable
housing, employment services, food security, education, First
Nations and new Canadians;” and environmental impact issuers,
defined as “ventures that are building environmental sustainability
in subsectors including renewable energy, sustainable agriculture,
consumer products, water, waste reduction and transportation.”211
In order to be listed, for-profit businesses must obtain a
satisfactory company rating through GIIRS, the privately
administered rating system described in the previous Part.212 SVX,
Id. at Ventures and funds, Question 8.
SVX ISSUER MANUAL, supra note 200, at 17.
208 Id. at 17.
209 Id. at 18.
210 Id. at 17.
211 SVX CASE STUDY, supra note 195, at 11.
212 GIIRS Ratings, B ANALYTICS, http://b-analytics.net/giirs-ratings/ (last
visited Mar. 2, 2015).
206
207
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therefore, relies on a third party standard setter to carry out an
important piece of the social business vetting process.213 In so doing,
SVX is helping to mainstream the use of GIIRS in the market for
social impact. As discussed, while there are complications with
using tools like GIIRS and IRIS to measure social impact, having
access to data points, like star and percentage-based scores, makes
it easier and cheaper for investors to compare different investment
opportunities. Transaction costs may be reduced by only a small
margin, however, as SVX cautions that it “cannot confirm the
accuracy or completeness of this information” and strongly
encourages investors to “conduct their own thorough due
diligence” before making investment decisions.214 Further, while
metrics facilitate investor decision-making, those who are serious
about impact may incur additional costs to verify impact claims and
supplement quantitative with qualitative performance assessments.
As concerns corporate governance, the Access Requirements
make brief mention of board composition: To be admitted,
businesses must submit “[e]vidence of relevant expertise within
management/officers and directors.”215 This suggests that SVX may
expect more of business heads than simply financial competence.
However, this is at most a vague nod in the direction of social
governance, and does not go far enough. Like SSX, SVX appears to
be missing a regulatory opportunity to ensure that social businesses
are run in a way that maximizes the pursuit of, and compliance with,
the social mission.
5.2.3.2. Disclosure and reporting requirements
Entities wishing to list on SVX must agree to the SVX Issuer
Agreement, which is contained in the SVX Issuer Manual, and
includes a number of substantive requirements.216 For example,
issuers must file GIIRS-issued proof of rating and proof of updated
ratings.217 Once capital is raised, issuers must report on how it is
spent and on “the impact achieved as a result of such use of
213
214
215
216
217

SVX ISSUER MANUAL, supra note 200, at 15, 18.
FAQ, supra note 204.
SVX ISSUER MANUAL, supra note 200, at 17.
Id. at 17-18, 32-34.
Id. at 32.
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capital.”218 One problem with this framework is that it is not clear
from the Issuer Agreement how often listed entities must provide
updated ratings. Since GIIRS ratings have to be updated every two
years to remain valid, it seems safe to assume that the same schedule
would apply for SVX’s purposes. This should be clarified, however,
as investors likely want assurance that they will not need to seek out
updated information on their own. Issuers are required to make
financial statements available annually and to prepare them using
generally accepted accounting methods.219 They must also comply
with applicable securities legislation and must not post any
information that is considered misleading.220
Thus, while traditional financial investor protections are in place
with SVX, it is less clear how well investors—and other
stakeholders, such as competing issuers and beneficiaries—are
protected against misinformation concerning issuers’ social
performance.
5.2.4. Enforcement mechanisms
Issuers are liable if they breach the Issuer Agreement. The
Agreement requires prospective issuers to acknowledge “that a
breach or threatened breach . . . will result in SVX suffering
irreparable harm which cannot be calculated or [sic] fully or
adequately compensated by recovery of damages alone.”221 In the
event of a breach, “SVX shall be entitled to interim and permanent
injunctive relief, specific performance and other equitable remedies,
in addition to any other relief to which SVX may become entitled.”222
In addition, the SVX Issuer Agreement also gives SVX the “right, at
any time, to halt, or suspend access to the SVX online platform or to
remove from the Applicant, temporarily or permanently, from the
SVX online platform, with or without notice and with or without
giving any reason for such action.”223

218
219
220
221
222
223
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With SVX, issuers who breach exchange rules can face a number
of sanctions, including monetary damages, injunctive relief, and delisting. This is sharper than the SSX enforcement mechanism, which
is limited to de-listing under the vaguely defined circumstance of a
change to the issuer’s business model. Though SVX appears serious
about enforcement, the Issuer Agreement still fails to explain when
and why this power will be deployed. It lists many contractual
obligations, but lacks specificity regarding what—beyond an
(annually updated) GIIRS rating and a periodic impact report—is
expected of issuers with regard to their social performance. It seems
likely that if an issuer were to abandon its social mission or
experience a big drop in its GIIRS rating, SVX would choose to
terminate the agreement.224 However, this is not specified and the
grounds for de-listing, or for finding a (social or other) breach
should be clarified. Like SSX, SVX is under-utilizing its regulatory
power by not defining with sufficient clarity the social commitments
it expects of its issuers, and by not filling the gaps left open by
conventional financial regulation with respect to identifying social,
rather than financial breaches.
5.2.5. Regulating investors
SVX’s manual for investors is very useful for understanding how
SVX regulates investor conduct.225 Additionally, investors are
required to enter into an Investor Agreement.226 These documents
contain a number of substantive obligations. First, only accredited
investors (as defined by the OSC), who are sophisticated enough to
invest without a prospectus, can access SVX. Depending on the
sophistication of the investor, they are subject to caps on how much
they can invest on SVX in any given year. These restrictions go to
investor protection.

224 Note that this mechanism looks a lot like the de-certification mechanism
employed by B-Lab when a B corporation fails to achieve a minimum score on the
Impact Assessment Survey. Interview with B Lab staff member, supra note 72.
225 See
generally
SVX,
INVESTOR
MANUAL,
available
at
http://s3.amazonaws.com/svx.staging/comfy/cms/files/files/000/000/178/SV
X_Investor_ Manual-original.pdf [hereinafter INVESTOR MANUAL].
226 SVX INVESTOR AGREEMENT, available at https://svx.ca/en/terms-of-use
(Oct. 3, 2015).
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Second, SVX specifically targets accredited investors who care
about impact. In answer to the question, “Who are the investors?”
the SVX Investor Manual identifies “[i]mpact-first investors with a
focus on achieving positive social and/or environmental outcomes
with patient capital investments.”227 (emphasis added). Indeed, SVX
acknowledges that social ventures require “a different type of
capital to help them grow, scale and achieve systemic impact. They
need impact capital: A type of investing with the goal of achieving
a triple bottom line of social, environmental and economic
return.”228
Thus, while there is no mention of mission drift in the SVX
documents, SVX clearly wants investors and businesses to commit,
and remain committed, to the social mission. Investors must be
“patient” and know from the outset that social finance returns are
not like financial returns from conventional investments that are
easily measurable and usually generated in the short term. In fact,
the SVX Investor Manual and the SVX Investor Agreement use hard
language (in bold face) to manage investor expectations: “Investing
in offerings posted on SVX has significant risk including severe
illiquidity . . . and potential volatility of the investment. The main
objective of these issuers is not to maximize returns to investors.
You should invest in SVX issuers only if you are prepared not to
receive any return on your investment and to lose your investment
in its entirety.”229 (emphasis added).
Like the Issuer Agreement, the SVX Investor Agreement
includes a liability provision. Clauses 10 and 11 give SVX the “right,
at any time, to halt, suspend or terminate the access of the [sic]
Investor to SVX online platform either temporarily or permanently,
with or without notice, and with or without giving any reason for
such action.”230 Like issuers, investors must also acknowledge that
breaches can result in various remedies for SVX. We can presume
that SVX would ban an investor who applied inappropriate pressure
on a listed entity to prioritize profit over impact or pushed the
investee away from its mission, but clarification is needed here. It is
needed because if indeed investors can be banned as a result of
committing a social breach, SVX would be introducing something
227
228
229
230

INVESTOR MANUAL, supra note 225, at 13.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 19.
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entirely new into the regulatory mix, marking a real departure from
the CSE model. Clarification is also needed because SVX, like SSX,
does not appear to provide recourse either for investors, listed
entities, or beneficiaries to bring complaints against each other.
SVX uses the Investor Agreement, the Investor Manual, and the
accredited investor restriction to regulate investors. It also employs
a deal cap mechanism: The maximum deal size for a social
business—and by extension, its investors—is limited, depending on
the submission of know-your-client and suitability requirements.231
The deal cap is interesting because it automatically limits the
financial returns that investors can obtain, which in turn directs
investor expectations toward impact rather than profit. The cap
should also help to regulate commercialization since it limits how
much and how fast a social business can grow, which, in turn,
should mitigate commercial pressures—whether coming from
outside or within the issuer—to prioritize profit over impact. It
would be good to clarify how many $10 million deals a social
business can enter into per year.

5.2.6. Preliminary assessment
With SVX, there are some questions as to both the regularity and
the quality of the social reporting, in particular as concerns the SSE’s
reliance on GIIRS (a proxy-based system for assessing social
impact). There is also a lack of clarity regarding the circumstances
under which a social business might be de-listed, or an investor’s
access to the platform revoked. Nevertheless, SVX appears to be
considerably more serious about regulating both issuers and
investors than SSX.
Social finance and impact investing proponents are generally
agnostic about whether investors are impact-first or profit-first. SVX
is very clear that its platform is for investors who care deeply about
advancing their investees’ social missions. This may deter profitfirst investors, but SVX evidently prefers to attract the “right”
investors onto its platform, even if doing so limits capital flows.
231

SVX ISSUER MANUAL, supra note 200, at 19.
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Indeed, judging by how it (almost aggressively) manages investor
expectations, it is apparent that SVX does not define success in
reference to its trading volumes alone.232 This is crucially important
for differentiating CSEs from SSEs. Additionally, SVX’s exclusive
focus on small and medium sized enterprises, especially combined
with the deal cap should go a long way toward keeping listed
entities in mission-protecting hands that are less concerned with
achieving large financial returns. The SVX framework would fare
better if social reporting requirements were more systematized, the
elements of social breach were better defined, the justifications for
terminating platform access were clearly articulated, corporate
governance requirements were more deeply considered, and if there
was a mechanism in place for the stakeholders to bring and resolve
complaints (or compliments).

5.3. The Impact Exchange (IX), Mauritius

5.3.1. The mission
The IX was established in 2013 and has yet to fully launch in the
sense of listing individual social businesses whose securities can be
bought and traded. When launch is complete, for-profits will be able
to sell common equity, preference shares or bonds, while non-profit
impact entities will be able to list bonds.233 So far, it appears that the
last piece is closest to completion with the upcoming launch of two
new types of social impact bonds.

232 See Pritchard, supra note 161, at 38 (observing that “[e]xchanges live or die
with trading volume”).
233 Impact Exchange Board Listing Guide, IMPACT EXCHANGE, 6 (Feb. 2014),
available at http://impactexchange.asiaiix.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/
Impact_Exchange_Listing_Guide_Feb2014_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter IX Impact
Listing Guide].
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Of the three SSEs reviewed here, IX is the only one that is an
actual public exchange. It is billed as “the world’s first public
trading platform dedicated to connecting Social Enterprises (SEs)
with mission-aligned investment.”234 Thus, IX will be fully
regulated and able to support the listing, trading, clearing and
settlement of social business-issued securities. This means that the
securities issued by social businesses on IX are liquid, and can be
resold to another investor. That is not the case for private placement
platforms, where investors cannot easily “exit,” as there is no
secondary market for purchased securities. Like “any other global
public trading platform,” IX provides advantages such as
“transparency, efficiency and liquidity—while also ensuring that
the social and/or environmental mission and impact of the issuers
are both safeguarded and showcased.”235
IX’s mission is to serve as “the public gateway for those who
wish to invest in sustainable change for the betterment of society
and the environment.”236 Like any CSE, therefore, IX is focused on
creating a fair efficient and transparent market with strong investor
protections; unlike CSEs, the focus on bettering the world is also
central, which requires developing strong mission and beneficiary
protections.
5.3.2. Trading and official oversight
The IX is a joint initiative between the Stock Exchange of
Mauritius Ltd (SEM) and Impact Investment exchange Asia (IIX
Singapore), based in Singapore.237 The latter incubated IX “to allow
larger Social Enterprises to access the public capital markets while
offering socially-minded Impact Investors the opportunity to
efficiently and effectively direct their capital into liquid investments
that align with their values.”238 IX seeks to commercialize entities
that “target underserved population groups . . . as . . . customers,
employees and/or other relevant stakeholders;” these are entities
234 Impact Exchange, ASIA IIX, http://impactexchange.asiaiix.com (last visited
Mar. 2, 2015).
235 IX Impact Listing Guide, supra note 233, at 4.
236 Id.
237 Mission, ASIA IIX, http://www.asiaiix.com/mission/ (last visited Mar. 2,
2015).
238 Id.
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that operate in Africa or the Asia Pacific region, though their
headquarters could be anywhere.239
The IX is operated by the SEM and is regulated by the Financial
Services Commission of Mauritius. The SEM, established in 1989, is
the only exchange in Africa and operates 3 boards: the Official
Market, the Development and Enterprise Market, and IX.240 As with
SVX and SSX, entities that list on the IX are subject to conventional
securities regulation.241 However, this only matters for the financial
dimension of impact investments and does not extend to their social
dimension. In other words, as with the other SSEs, IX is responsible
for the social regulation of impact investments. Annual revenues
will determine the listing fees.
As mentioned, trading was due to begin at the end of 2014, but
as of this Writing, that has not happened. When the Author inquired
about the launch, she was informed that the current priority is to
create two types of social impact bonds that will be issued on the IX:
the Humanity Bond and the Women’s Livelihood Bond (“WLB”).242
The former will be issued by social service organizations—primarily
non-profit, which do not include social businesses of the type at
issue in this article—to raise funds for programs that save lives and
“enable service organizations to overcome the challenge of unstable,
inconsistent cash flows while offering an attractive investment
proposition to new investors:
One which can create a
social/environmental impact while simultaneously generating a
modest financial return.”243 The WLB involves issuing a $20 million
debt product, “targeting women as the core beneficiaries.”244 A
collective of social enterprises and MFIs will issue a WLB to “scale
their high-impact, revenue-generating programs to empower
women.”245 With the WLB, businesses would pool together as
239 FAQ, IMPACT EXCHANGE, http://impactexchange.asiaiix.com/faq/ (last
visited Mar. 2, 2015) [hereinafter IX FAQ].
240 IX Impact Listing Guide, supra note 233, at 5.
241 Id. at 6.
242 Humanity Bond, ASIA IIX, http://www.asiaiix.com/humanity-bond/ (last
visited Mar. 1, 2015).
243 Jenna Liang, The Humanity Bond: A Life Saving Game Changer For All, IMPACT
QUARTERLY (Oct. 13, 2014), http://impactquarterly.asiaiix.com/the-humanitybond-a-life-saving-game-changer-for-all/.
244 The WLB Structure, ASIA IIX, http://www.asiaiix.com/womens-livelihoodbond/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
245 About WLB, ASIA IIX, http://www.asiaiix.com/womens-livelihood-bond/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
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borrowers and enter into a contract with investors to repay the loan
at maturity, with interest paid at fixed intervals over the bond
duration.246 A white paper on these new financial instruments is
forthcoming, but as of this Writing, there is not enough information
available on these instruments to assess how effective the IX will be
in administering them.
5.3.3. Regulating social businesses

5.3.3.1. Listing and governance requirements
Perhaps the most interesting feature of IX is that it introduces a
new figure into the listing and compliance process: Potential issuers
must appoint an Authorized Impact Representative (“AIR”) to
support them in the listing process and to ensure compliance with
listing requirements.247 All AIRs must be accredited and registered
with the SEM.
The listing requirements break down into social and financial
categories. In their application package, prospective issuers must:
(1) clearly specify that positive social or environmental impact is the
primary reason for their existence; (2) clearly articulate the purpose
and intent of the company in the form of a theory of change—the
basis for demonstrating social performance; (3) commit to ongoing
monitoring and evaluation of impact performance, using clearly
defined impact indicators for performance assessment and
reporting; (4) have a minimum of one year of impact reports
prepared in accordance with IX reporting principles; (5) obtain
certification of impact reports by an independent standards or rating
body 12 months prior to listing.248 On the financial side, a
prospective issuer must, among other things: (1) demonstrate that
it uses a market-based approach to achieve its purpose and provide
financial returns sufficient to meet investors expectations; (2)
publish financial statements meeting internationally accepted

246
247
248

Id.
IX Impact Listing Guide, supra note 233, at 14.
Id. at 10.
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standards for at least one year prior to listing; (3) have minimum
market capitalization of $700, 000.249
On corporate governance, prospective issuers must address a
question: “Are the key management positions filled and are there
strategies in place to retain key employees and key customers?”250
This appears to be the only place that references to the leadership
skills base is referenced. It also appears to be the only place that
beneficiary interests are brought into the regulatory fold. IX
imposes no requirements on issuers to include beneficiaries or
beneficiary representatives in their governance, nor are issuers
required to have mechanisms for registering beneficiary feedback.
Like SSX and SVX, IX is under-utilizing its regulatory power by not
implementing standards, rules, or measures that concretely
differentiate the social from the conventional financial space.
5.3.3.2. Disclosure and reporting requirements
As mentioned above, issuers must comply with the securities
laws and reporting regulations of Mauritius, the SEM, and with the
IX Rules. The latter govern listings, set out the requirements for
issuers to remain listed, such as reporting and “certain aspects of
issuer conduct,” and the minimum standards of behavior to ensure
that market is “fair, orderly and transparent.”251 IX issuers cannot
sell their securities on another exchange, which means that IX has
exclusive regulatory control over its issuers.
Issuers must provide independently verified social and financial
reports multiple times per year.252 While financial reporting is
standardized (using IFRS), the IX Rules do not specify what
standards are to be used for social reporting. This creates two
problems. First, it is unclear whether IX impact reports will
incorporate beneficiary experiences and feedback. To the extent that
reports are metrics-heavy, they will capture only proxies for impact
and thus fall short of conveying a full picture of beneficiaries’
experiences (positive or negative). Second, as with SSX, inconsistent
reporting standards increase the costs of investor due diligence.
249
250
251
252

Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 9.
Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

214

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:1

This problem is compounded if issuers select standards that are
easier to satisfy and make them look better to investors.
AIRs help address this, insofar as they supervise listed entities’
selection of standards and verify impact reports.253 Unlike SVX and
SSX, IX has accredited individuals on staff to verify the content of
the impact reports, which reduces the likelihood of
misrepresentations to investors. Indeed, AIR assistance “is intended
to . . . bolster investor confidence—through independent verification
of the social and environmental impact of the issuer.”254 AIRs,
therefore, have an important role to play. Additionally, the integrity
of IX depends on how thoroughly they do their job, which is
assessed by how demanding they are about selecting quality metrics
and standards, and how deeply they look into the experiences of
beneficiaries when verifying reports.
5.3.4. Enforcement mechanisms
There is no information concerning the consequences of
breaching IX Rules. Presumably, if an entity breaches, it can be delisted. If it breaches the SEM (conventional securities) rules, the
entity can be served with a formal written letter of disapproval and
requested to explain its actions and rectify the situation. The SEM
can also publish any censure, refer the company to the Financial
Services Commission for further disciplining, and suspend or
remove its listing.255 While these are strong mechanisms, it is
unclear to what extent the SEM mechanisms will extend to
incorporate breaches (social and financial) of the IX Rules and this
should be clarified.
As with SSX and SVX, IX provides no mechanisms for investors,
social businesses, or beneficiaries to bring complaints against each
other.

IX FAQ, supra note 239.
IX Impact Listing Guide, supra note 233, at 14.
255 Regulatory Functions of the SEM, STOCK EXCHANGE OF MAURITIUS,
http://www.stockexchangeofmauritius.com/regulatory-functions-of-the-SEM
(last visited March 2, 2015).
253
254
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5.3.5. Regulating the investors
The IX does not distinguish between impact-first and profit-first
investors; rather, it “is designed to accommodate all investors,
including retail investors.”256 In contrast to SVX, which requires
investors to enter an Investor Agreement, IX does not have a
mechanism for committing investors to their investees’ social
mission. Further, there are no investor screens or rules for
regulating the conduct of investors on the IX platform. The
language in the FAQs may help to manage investor expectations of
return: “As with any investment, the financial return that the
investor achieves will depend on a variety of factors including the
financial performance of the enterprise and the availability of a
ready buyer if the investor wishes to sell the investment.”257 In
comparison, the SVX language is much stronger and likely more
effective in terms of deterring the “wrong” kind of investor.
The IX Listings Guide includes useful language concerning
“mission protection:” “Because monitoring of each issuer’s impact
is built into the Listing Rules . . . , issuers are ensured that access to
capital can be achieved without losing purpose, mission and
integrity. At the same time, investors are ensured that their coinvestors are like minded in their support of the issuer’s mission.”258
(emphasis added). As suggested by this quote, with IX, the main
mechanism for regulating investors is self-selection; those interested
in supporting the mission will come and others will not. Selfselection can fall short of protecting the promise of social finance,
especially for IX, which is an actual trading platform. This is because
investors can exit their investments and sell their impact securities
to others. If the initial investors are not committed to the social
mission, there is reason to be concerned that they will sell to buyers
who are even less committed, or who care more about the securities’
financial value rather than their social value. The risk of making
social impact “liquid” through trading is that the commitment to the
issuers’ social mission could become diluted, which, in turn, can
create pressure to prioritize profitability over impact, to the
detriment of beneficiaries.
256
257
258

IX FAQ, supra note 239.
Id.
IX Impact Listing Guide, supra note 233, at 7.
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5.3.6. Preliminary assessment
As an initial assessment of IX, there is a benefit to introducing
AIRs into the regulatory sphere, as they help keep social businesses
in check and guide them toward good reporting and business
management practices. However, this benefit may be undermined
for three reasons. First, as discussed, existing metrics and standards
for tracking social performance, such as IRIS and GIIRS, are deficient
because they tell only an abbreviated story about impact. This
problem is compounded if issuers report on “easy” metrics that
make them look better than deserved. Second, IX does not specify
what reporting standards to use, which increases transaction costs
for investors by complicating the comparison of investment
opportunities. Third, even if the AIR succeeds in keeping social
businesses social, its efforts may be jeopardized by the underregulation of IX investors.
Indeed, the only device employed by IX to attract the “right”
kind of investor is self-selection, which is a relatively poor
mechanism, particularly considering the dangers that
commercialization creates for mission protection. This is especially
problematic, since IX is (or will be) a real exchange with a secondary
market for impact securities, which will make it easier for investors
to exit their investments—as compared with private placement
platforms. In the conventional finance context, liquidity is a major
draw for investors. However, in the social finance context, liquidity
could diminish the integrity of investors’ commitment to the
mission. As rule makers for social finance, in order to protect the
beneficiaries, SSEs must use their regulatory power to ensure that
investor commitment to the mission is not diluted, but sustained. It
is unclear whether IX will be effective in serving this regulatory
function.
6. SSE REGULATION: PROGNOSES AND PRESCRIPTIONS
As demonstrated in the previous Part, the regulatory devices
employed by SSEs—listings requirements, reporting and
governance requirements, and enforcement mechanisms—largely
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track those of CSEs, with more or less effective social adjustments.
In this Part, I review each device and recommend ways to make it
more responsive to the regulatory needs of social finance and its
beneficiaries. At the outset, it helps to break SSE regulatory
functions into two protective spheres, one for beneficiaries and one
for investors. On the one hand, SSEs are tasked with protecting the
social mission of listed issuers, which is directly tied to protecting
the interests of the beneficiaries who are serviced by the issuer. On
the other, SSEs are tasked with protecting investors who will only
invest if they trust the market and the information they receive
about issuers’ social and financial performance. Both spheres are
considered below.
6.1. The Mission
In its own way, each SSE commits to achieving social welfare
gains by establishing a regulated market for transacting in impact
securities. This points to a fundamental difference between SSEs
and CSEs where social welfare is at best derivative byproduct of
investor gains. This difference must be captured in the mission
statement. SSE mission statements offer important signals to
potential users—investors and issuers—who are deciding whether
or not to access a particular platform. Equally important, the
formulation of the mission dictates the design of whatever
framework is established to achieve it. To make positive societal
contributions, therefore, SSEs must place social objectives at the
heart of their mission statement and adopt an operational design
that best advances that mission.
Canada’s SVX may do the best job here because it speaks of
success not in terms of attracting investors or trading volumes but
in terms of bettering the world. Indeed, when it comes to defining
success, a by-product of formulating the mission, it is imperative
that SSEs not identify trading volumes as the main criteria. The
number of listed entities and the amount of capital flowing into the
market for social impact are only proxies for SSE success. True
success must be assessed against the goal of improving social
welfare. While the tendency in the CSE context is to equate social
welfare with increased capital flows, these variables ought to be kept
separate in the SSE context. Should SSEs conflate financial and
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social gains, these vehicles for commercializing social businesses
could become complicit in creating a perfect mission drift storm.
Baradaran makes a similar point in the context of banking
regulation. 259 She explains that while regulation initially directed
banks to serve the public interest, it gradually shifted to enable
banks to pursue profitability for its own sake.260 She recounts how
over time, “public benefit” became synonymous with profitability
so that today, “[t]o show a public benefit, a bank need only prove
that the proposed activity increases efficiency and competition,
which do favor the public tangentially, but are not direct benefits.”261
To reverse this trend, Baradaran advocates a return to the “public
benefit test” and recommends that regulators “develop a new
regulatory paradigm built on a reinvigorated social contract that
will ensure banks meet the needs of the public in years to come.”262
SSEs are poised to invigorate the promise of social finance
through the development and administration of new, marketspecific, rules. To play this role effectively, however, SSEs must
clearly formulate their own mission around a commitment to
improve social welfare. This requires adopting a definition of
success that goes far beyond the CSE measure of trading volumes.
It also requires being explicit about the protection of beneficiary
interests, particularly against mission drift, and about creating a safe
space for social businesses to commercialize their financing so that
incentives to drift are minimized. The following three core values
should be enshrined in every SSE mission statement: A commitment
to achieving social (and environmental) gains, the protection of
investment-affected individuals and communities, and the creation
of a safe and well regulated market for social impact.

259 Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1293, 1310 (2014).
260 Id. at 1341.
261 Id. at 1341.
262 Id. at 1342.
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6.2. Regulating Social Businesses
6.2.1. Listing and governance requirements
While a number of countries are beginning to require some form
of sustainability (environmental and social) reporting by publicly
listed entities, the listing and corporate governance requirements of
CSEs remain primarily focused on verifying the financial integrity
of issuers.263 For SSEs, however, it is imperative to collect and
monitor information pertaining to issuers’ social integrity, and a few
recommendations can be made in this regard. The first is for SSEs
to stimulate inclusive governance by instituting requirements that
shape issuers’ leadership. The second recommendation, which is
perhaps harder, is for SSEs to require that issuers have a system for
collecting feedback from Worker and Customer Beneficiaries. And
the third is to bolster the listing and governance requirements that
serve to limit the mission-diluting effects of commercialization.
With respect to inclusive governance, none of the SSEs impose
adequate requirements.
Governance issues feature only
peripherally in the listing process, through questions (not
requirements) about the composition of the executive board. SSEs
should be more demanding in this regard. Leadership constitutes
an important source of mission protection and SSEs should use their
regulatory power to require that executives possess beneficiaryoriented skills and credentials to help the venture meet the
expectations of investors and beneficiaries. It is not enough to refer
to existing codes of corporate governance, as SSX does, because
these codes are tailored for conventional corporations that are far
more concerned with financial than social performance.
In his overview of social governance, Arena refers favorably to
the Grameen model, which is essentially a microcredit cooperative
where the borrowers are also the shareholders of the MFI.264 Though
263 See generally Global CSR Disclosure, the Harvard Initiative for Responsible
Investment, available at http://hausercenter.org/iri/about/global-csr-disclosurerequirements; see generally Galit A. Sarfaty, Human Rights Meets Securities
Regulation, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 97 (2013).
264 Arena, supra note 41, at 290; see Henry Hansmann, THE OWNERSHIP OF
ENTERPRISE (2000) (describing and explaining different models of corporate
ownership, including investor-owned, producer-owned, and customer owned
enterprises).
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imperfect, this model has the distinct advantage that it directly
involves those who are impacted by a social business in corporate
governance. Where having beneficiary shareholders is not viable,
another option is to appoint a social director whose “role is to ensure
that the organization remains responsive to the social
transformation of clients and adheres to stated social goals.”265
While the IX’s AIRs could come close to fulfilling this missionprotecting function, it would be preferable to have someone on the
inside who is part of the issuer’s executive team. AIRs should
support, not substitute, the social director. Requiring issuers to
appoint a social director or some equivalent as a listing requirement
is easily within the regulatory reach of SSEs, and would enhance
their ability to protect the interests of beneficiaries, if only indirectly.
Furthermore, by developing the terms of reference for a social
director, including credentials and day-to-day obligations, SSEs
would help issuers to operationalize a broad conception of fiduciary
duty that extends beyond shareholders to stakeholders. In fact, SSE
listing rules should require issuers to expressly commit to expanded
fiduciary duties, and SSEs should help their issuers to understand
what complying with those duties means in practice. The IX model
nicely illustrates how listing requirements create learning
opportunities for issuers and how SSEs can offer guidance to help
issuers operationalize that learning: Yes, impose stringent missionprotecting obligations on issuers, but also give them guidance and
support in complying with those requirements.
The second recommendation concerns the solicitation of
beneficiary feedback. In this regard the U.K.’s SSX offers an initial
solution by requiring prospective issuers to identify their target
beneficiaries and to show how they involve and consult with that
group. Neither IX nor SVX ask issuers to demonstrate how they
involve beneficiaries. At a minimum, SSEs should require issuers to
identify their beneficiaries and to have mechanisms in place for
soliciting feedback. If beneficiary input is not sought regularly, this
should count against admitting the issuer to the SSE. Ideally, SSEs
would also set thresholds for admission based on the quality of
beneficiary feedback; however, given the challenges involved with
comparing this type of qualitative, non-objective, information, that
may not be realistic. SSEs should carry out some high level due
diligence on applicants; if such diligence reveals that a would-be
265

Id. at 306-07.
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issuer received negative beneficiary feedback, that should weigh
against admitting them to the platform.
The third recommendation deals with using SSE regulatory
power to limit the mission-diluting effects of commercialization. In
this regard, SVX introduces an easy-to-replicate listing requirement
that doubles as a mission-protecting mechanism. The focus on small
and medium sized enterprises, especially when combined with the
deal cap should significantly mitigate commercial pressures to
prioritize growth over impact.
By regulating the pace of
commercialization, SVX facilitates issuer compliance with—rather
than drift from—their mission.
Such rules protect issuers,
beneficiaries, and investors who may be reluctant to invest without
assurance that their co-investors are comparably committed to the
social mission. Other SSEs should consider instituting similar issuer
size and deal cap requirements.
Across the board, SSEs could make better use of their regulatory
power when it comes to dealing with changes to issuers’ investor
base, use of assets, and ownership. As explained, such changes can
contribute to mission drift, particularly if newcomers have differing
commitments to the issuer’s social mission.266 Conventional
corporate law includes various devices for defending against
challenges to corporate control. For example, in the U.S., for-profit
corporations can create classified shares of stock with different
voting rights, institute staggered boards, and implement (or
threaten to) a shareholder rights plan commonly referred to as a
“poison pill.” By and large, these mechanisms have been quite
effective, particularly when used in combination.267 As explained
below in the discussion on investor regulation, similar devices could
be employed in the social business context to mitigate the risk of
mission dilution resulting from commercialization.

266 See Cummings supra note 60, at 589 (cautioning that hybrids must “prevent
neglect of the social bottom line if the company assumes new leadership . . . if
controlling shares are acquired by someone who wants to prioritize profit- making,
or in response to market pressures.”); see also, Belifanti, supra note 74, at 827
(explaining “going public represents a transition from being surrounded by a core
base of founders, initial investors, and employees who are hopefully supportive of
the firm’s mission and value proposition, to being surrounded by a new group of
shareholders who may or may not support the firm’s value proposition”).
267 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 893 (2002)
(explaining the antitakeover power of staggered boards).
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As concerns regulating the use of social business assets and
ownership, it is helpful to consider the U.K. model for regulating
CICs. The CIC Regulator imposes an asset lock to ensure that “the
assets of the CIC (including any profits or other surpluses generated
by its activities) are used for the benefit of the community.”268 The
asset lock works in two main ways: First, it places an aggregate cap
on dividends to keep CIC earnings within the company and
encourages the reinvestment of earnings toward benefit—rather
than investor “extraction.”269 Second, the lock restricts transfer of
CIC assets, principally to other CICs or asset-locked entities.270
Following this model, SSEs could require that their issuers adopt
asset lock and change of control restrictions to ensure that
ownership remains in mission-safe and benefit-enhancing hands.
To the extent that there is concern about chilling the market for
impact through over-regulation, SSEs could also consider instituting
patient investor incentives, as described below.
If SSEs were to enhance listing and governance requirements to
incorporate these suggestions, it would go a long way toward
ensuring compliance with issuers’ missions and with the SSEs’ own
missions. It would also significantly increase SSEs’ ability to
regulate in the interests of the poor, while protecting those of
investors, so that both spheres of regulation are adequately shielded
from the effects of broken promises.
6.2.2. Disclosure and reporting requirements
To establish a fair, healthy, and trustworthy market for impact
securities, SSEs—like CSEs before them—must devise mechanisms
for filling information gaps to correct asymmetries between insiders
and outsiders, and promote the standardization of social finance.
Conventional financial disclosure and reporting requirements are
designed to protect investors and blueprinting against the CSE
model works well for that purpose. With respect to social reporting,
OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, INFORMATION
GUIDANCE NOTES, CHAPTER 6: THE ASSET LOCK 3, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/416360/14-1089-community-interest-companies-chapter-6-the-asset-lock.pdf.
269 Id. at 6-7 (explaining that, to ensure that they do not pay out too much of
their profits in dividends, CICs are subject to an aggregate dividend cap of 35%).
270 Id. at 3.
268
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however, the CSE blueprint is inadequate since it supports only a
narrow welfare-enhancing mission. If SSEs are to succeed in
achieving ambitious social gains, they must adjust the conventional
disclosure and reporting blueprint to protect investors and the
beneficiaries of those investments. This is by no means an easy task
and SSEs face at least two challenges in carrying it out.
First, as already discussed, the metrics and standards available
for social reporting do not in fact capture impact, which means that
investor decisions could be based on incomplete information and
that initiatives which are impactful-in-fact but score poorly on
quantitative assessments may go under-funded, to the detriment of
beneficiaries. Second, for those SSEs that do not specify a particular
set of reporting standards, there is a risk that issuers will
opportunistically select those that are easiest to satisfy, in order to
appear more attractive to investors. For investors serious about
impact, these challenges increase the transaction costs of engaging
in social finance.
Further, because the metrics and standards for tracking social
impact are imperfect, and because there is no universal standard for
reporting on social performance, investors lack the tools for
identifying “social misrepresentations.” Indeed, it is easier to show
that an issuer has misrepresented its financial performance—which
is primarily about numbers—than its social performance—which is
more subjective and considerably harder to measure. Because of this
fundamental difference, SSEs will no doubt struggle to protect
investors from instances of red washing where issuers misrepresent
their social performance.
One initial solution could be to require issuers to report both on
metrics and on the substantive feedback they solicit from
beneficiaries. Again, this is not an easy proposition to convert into
a workable requirement, but unless a concerted effort is made to
collect and convey beneficiary experiences, a major piece of the SSE
informational regulation mechanism will be missing. Without that
piece, both the investor and the beneficiary spheres of protection are
weakened.
6.3. Enforcement mechanisms
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To effectively protect both investors and beneficiaries, SSEs
should upgrade the CSE blueprint to regulate not only issuer
conduct, but also investor conduct. SVX does the best job in this
regard since it requires issuers and investors to enter into
contractual agreements with relatively robust remedies provisions.
It also does the best job of laying out what sanctions are available,
including de-listing, revoking platform access, and monetary
damages. The SSX and IX documents say virtually nothing about
the consequences of non-compliance with SSE rules.
While SVX is ahead as far as outlining the sanctions for
misconduct on the platform, none of the SSEs adequately specify
what kinds of misconduct actually justify enforcement. This should
be rectified. Enforcement is an important part of the regulatory
toolkit, and it must have (at least a few) teeth to deter misconduct.
Unless social obligations are clearly spelled out, it will be hard to
know when they have been breached.
For an issuer, a social breach could be something simple, like a
diminished GIIRS rating. Ideally, however, the definition of social
breach would be versatile enough to incorporate various forms of
mission drift, particularly if beneficiaries are at risk of being harmed
or exploited. For investors, a social breach would occur if they
pressured an issuer to depart from its mission in order to increase
profitability. For example, an investor could push an investee to
focus on more affluent populations so as to reduce the transaction
costs of servicing the poor, which would leave the initial target
population under-served, yet again. Such pressure-dynamics are
hard to detect, which is why a three-way accountability mechanism
such as the one described below would be useful.
6.4. Regulating Investors
The regulation of issuers and investors constitutes another
challenging but necessary departure from the CSE blueprint. In the
CSE setting, investors are the principal beneficiaries of the
regulatory framework. In contrast, with social finance, those who
benefit from regulation include the investors, the issuers, and
Consumer and Worker-Beneficiaries. Such a multiplication of
regulatory beneficiaries requires a multiplication of the subjects of
regulation, which must include investors.
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Regulating investors is particularly important for an SSE like IX
that promises liquidity and the freedom to exit investments.
Liquidity or ease of exit can be problematic for a couple of reasons.
First, it encourages short-termism, whereby long-term opportunities
are sacrificed to meet short-term expectations of return.271 Shorttermism can be dangerous in any context,272 but particularly in
impact investing where social gains can take longer to materialize
than financial returns—or losses. Indeed, as the SVX documents
indicate, financial returns may be disappointing for indefinite
periods of time. Should investors fail to grasp the special-ness of
this space and exit too quickly, they could drive down the value of
securities and jeopardize the missions of the issuers and of the SSE.
Second, investors who trade in liquid impact securities could vary
in their social commitment and some may pressure issuers to
prioritize profitability over impact, to the detriment of beneficiaries.
For these reasons, it is important that SSE investors be truly patient
and harbor different expectations of short-term returns than their
CSE counterparts.
One way for SSEs to regulate investors is through the
administration of an investor screen designed to ensure that
investors seeking platform access are true impact investors. The
SVX Investor Agreement requires that investors acknowledge the
possibility that their investments will yield no financial return.
Especially when combined with the deal cap, the Investor
Agreement serves to manage investor expectations and deter profitfirst investors from accessing the platform. We can think of the SVX
mechanism as a self-selection screen that investors can use to decide
if the platform suits their needs. While self-selection is a powerful
screening device, it would be preferable to have a screen that is
administered by the SSE to ensure that access to the market for social
impact is granted only to patient investors. Where self-selection is

271 See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 3-4 (2012)
(challenging shareholder primacy as an ideology—not a law—that requires
directors of public corporations to maximize shareholder wealth rather than
prioritize long term goals like “growing the firm, creating quality products,
protecting employees, and serving the public interest”).
272 In the conventional finance context, proposals for a transactions tax or a
Tobin Tax are directed at this issue, see Q&A: What Is the Tobin Tax on Financial
Trading, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-15552412.
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the only tool for regulating investors, as is the case with IX, the
beneficiary sphere of SSE regulation may be under-protected.
Self-selection should therefore be supplemented with other
devices, such as an investor agreement similar to the one employed
by SVX, or a “Patient Investor Code of Conduct” to which investors
would subscribe before being granted admission to the platform.
The Code, a type of soft law, would explain what it means to be a
patient investor, includes a list of dos and don’ts to guide behavior,
as well as substantive commitments. For example, signatories could
commit to holding investments for a minimum period of time, e.g.
three years, and selling impact securities only to other screened
investors or Code signatories. They could further commit to
prioritizing impact expansion over profit extraction, which would
allow/encourage investees to reinvest profits into their programs
and lower investor expectations of receiving high dividends or
interest on debt instruments.
Such (soft) commitments would combine to create an asset-lock
mechanism similar to the U.K.’s, but this time focused on investors
rather than issuer businesses. The Code, fleshed out with principles
and commitments, would further serve to identify the type of
investor conduct that constitutes a social breach, which would
bolster SSE enforcement mechanisms, as recommended above.
Rather than each SSE having its own code, it might be preferable for
an industry player like the GIIN to develop a single Patient Investor
Code of Conduct and to require that investors subscribe to it as a
condition for GIIN membership. SSEs could then simply add GIIN
membership to their individual investor screens.
In preparing the Code, drafters could consult the U.K.
Stewardship Code, which applies to signatory institutional
investors in publicly traded companies on a “comply or explain”
basis.273 That document contains seven principles designed to
“protect and enhance the value that accrues to the ultimate
beneficiary.”274 Signatory investors (1) publicly disclose their policy
on how they will discharge their stewardship responsibilities; (2)
have a robust policy on managing conflicts of interest in relation to
stewardship which should be publicly disclosed; (3) monitor their
273 See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE U.K. STEWARDSHIP CODE 6-10 (2012),
http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e2db042e-120b-4e4e-bdc7-d540923533a6/
UK- Stewardship-Code-September-2012.aspx (detailing the guiding principles
overseeing investor stewardship).
274 Id.
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investee companies; (4) establish clear guidelines on when and how
they will escalate their stewardship activities; (5) be willing to act
collectively with other investors when appropriate; (6) have a clear
policy and disclosure of voting activity; and (7) report periodically
on their stewardship and voting activities.275 For SSEs, Principles
(2), (3), and (4) are the most relevant because they invite investors to
actively participate in the pursuit of their investee’s mission, while
committing them to refrain from engaging in self-serving conduct.
An important adjustment to the Stewardship Code for social
finance purposes would involve expanding the definition of
“ultimate beneficiary” to include not only the investor’s clients
(those on whose behalf investors allocate capital) but also Worker
and Customer-Beneficiaries. With this fundamental adjustment,
much of what is contained in the U.K. Stewardship Code could be
usefully incorporated into a Patient Investor Code of Conduct. Since
investors in the social finance space are heterogeneous in terms of
their size, mission, and complexity, the “comply or explain”
principle should apply in the SSE context as well, so as to allow
investors (justified) latitude in observing some principles more than
others.
Having a code would serve not only to regulate investor
conduct but also, as Belifanti puts it, to “cultivate” investors to
provide the type of capital that issuers and co-investors want to see
circulating within the market for social impact. Belifanti explains
that the aim of “[c]ultivation is to identify, attract, and cultivate a
core of committed . . . stewards who understand the firm’s purpose
and value proposition”276 The underlying notion is that where
investors collaborate with investees to advance the mission, the
opportunities for disruptive conflicts of interest and managerial
maneuverings are lessened.
She proposes several tools for incentivizing cultivation:
Businesses could issue what she calls “MY Shares or Mission-Yield
shares,” that give greater voting rights to stewards; they could also
issue time-weighted dividends that increase in proportion to the
length of a steward’s investment; or “mission-weighted” dividends
that depend not on the duration but the quality of the investment;
Id.
Belifanti, supra note 74 at 792, 812 (identifying two main characteristics of
stewards: (1) their “investment behavior meshes with the firm’s vision and
operational strategy;” and (2) the steward “understands and is supportive of the
firm’s mission and management’s long-term strategy . . . .”).
275
276
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issuers could also set up a stewards “rewards” program and points
could be applied toward the purchase of additional shares or firm
products and services.277 Such investor benefits could incentivize
good stewardship and offset some of the costs of being regulated.
For those investors who behave in opposition to their investee’s
mission, Belifanti suggests “de-cultivation” tools, such as share
buybacks and going private.278 While these (de)cultivation tools
would be put to use by issuers, not SSEs, the latter could encourage
listed entities to adopt them as part of their corporate governance.
6.5. Grievance Mechanisms
A key ingredient for CSE success is investor trust. This is equally
important in the SSE context, though with yet another social
adjustment: The SSE marketplace must be trusted not only by
investors, but also by the issuers, who should be “matched” with
investors whose values and priorities align with their own. SSEs
have a big part to play in creating healthy matches and making sure
that everyone is on the same hybridity plane. Should matches that
start out right become wrong, issuers and investors should have
access to recourse.
In the CSE context, investors are able to register complaints
about inappropriate issuer conduct. They should be able to do this
in the SSE context as well. Additionally, SSE issuers should be able
to register complaints concerning inappropriate investor conduct—
perhaps consulting the above mentioned Patient Investor Code of
Conduct. Having the opportunity to air complaints about the
investor/ee relationship through an SSE administered grievance
mechanism could be hugely beneficial for keeping interests aligned
within this delicate hybrid space and for trust building generally.279
Ideally, beneficiaries would also be able to register complaints about
social businesses. The multiplicity of regulatory beneficiaries
fundamentally distinguishes conventional from social finance
Id. at 845.
Id. at 842-44.
279 See Kishanthi Parella, Procedural Fairness by the Corporation, 56 VA. J. INT’L L.
(forthcoming 2016) (on file with author), Abstract
available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2557030 (explaining that firm-level grievance
mechanisms are important for building trust between workers, community
stakeholders, and employers).
277
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regulation, and grievance mechanisms could be important for
accommodating this difference. In setting up such a mechanism,
SSEs could consider the model of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel,
which allows individuals (in groups of two or more) who have been
negatively affected by Bank projects to bring their claims to an
independent panel for review.280 Though it may be too challenging
this early in SSEs’ lives to establish a grievance mechanism for
beneficiaries, it is something to aspire to down the line. For now,
the recommended adjustments to the listing and governance
requirements should help create some degree of three-way
accountability.
The adjustments to the CSE blueprint recommended in this Part
may be viewed as onerous to conventional investors. However, this
is likely not the case for those impact investors who are serious
about safeguarding investee missions and achieving social welfare
gains. In fact, the latter’s trust in the SSE marketplace could be
deepened if they share express social commitments with other
investors on the platform, and if mechanisms are put in place to
stimulate compliance with those commitments. In other words,
while some may be concerned about the chilling effects of regulating
the market for impact as recommended here, better regulation
would ultimately advance the interests of anyone who is sincerely
committed to realizing the potential of social finance.
7. CONCLUSION
Proponents of social finance see it as a vehicle for transforming
the role of business in society and harnessing market forces to better
meet social challenges. Critics see it as symptomatic of a
problematic over-reliance on markets to tackle every type of
problem, even social problems that may be better addressed without
expectations of return. The concern is that by injecting the social
provisioning system with an ROI mentality, we risk deepening,
rather than reducing, the vulnerability of the world’s poor. My own
position is that the market for social impact is not yet mature enough
280 See generally How To File a Request for Inspection to the World Bank
Inspection Panel, available at http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/
Documents/Guidelines_How%20to%20File_for_web.pdf; Meet the Panel, available
at http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/MeetthePanel.aspx.
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to justify adopting one view or the other categorically. However, in
order to ensure that the critical view does not become prophecy,
regulatory frameworks must be upgraded to better govern the
growth of social finance.
As transnational rulemaking laboratories for social finance, SSEs
are ideal vehicles for testing regulatory solutions that meet the
specific requirements of social finance. SSEs are not the only (or
even the best) regulators of social finance, but they do provide a
unique opportunity to imagine new ways of regulating in the
interest of the poor. It would be a shame not to make the most of
this opportunity, especially while the market for social impact is still
being formed.
This article has argued that to serve as effective regulators, SSEs
must add a beneficiary-protection mandate to the conventional
investor-protection mandate. They must strive to inject beneficiary
protections into every dimension of their work including the
mission statement, listing and corporate governance requirements,
reporting requirements, and enforcement mechanisms. Social
regulations should be imposed not only on the listed businesses, but
also on the investors who transact on these platforms, in order to
minimize incentives to drift from the social mission. Such
regulatory innovations would contribute greatly to realizing the
potential of social finance, ensuring that its promises are fulfilled,
not undermined.
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